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Introduction 
Social Epistemology and the Problem of Disagreement 
 There are at least four prima facie categories of evidence: observation, deductive 
inference, inductive inference, and testimony.1 The first three have had a great deal of attention 
paid to them in philosophy; the fourth, however, has been relatively neglected. Whatever the 
reason for this neglect, it cannot have arisen from the insignificance of the role played by 
testimony in the forming of beliefs in the community, as C.A.J. Coady observes in his 1973 
article on “Testimony and Observation.”2 Due to the failure of classical epistemology to give 
testimony its due, that epistemology has come under fire from a number of quarters within the 
last fifty years or so. Critics charge that traditional epistemological undertakings have been too 
individualistic, assuming that cognitive achievements belong to the individual believer alone, all 
the while ignoring the part that others play in the acquisition and transmission of knowledge.3 In 
response to these concerns about classical epistemology’s overly narrowed focus on the 
individual, a branch of epistemology called social epistemology has sprung to the foreground.  
 Social epistemology studies questions regarding the social dimensions of knowledge.4  
One of the key elements of this social theory of knowledge is testimony. Human beings are 
                                                 
1 C.A.J. Coady, “Testimony and Observation,” in Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology, 
eds. Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), 537.  
 
2 Ibid.  
 
3 Diego E. Machuca, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Disagreement and Skepticism, ed. Diego E. Machuca (New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 2.    
 
4 In his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on social epistemology, Alvin Goldman writes that in 
the history of philosophy there have been relatively few signs of social epistemology until recently. In the second 
half of the 20th century philosophers and theorists launched a variety of debunking movements aimed at classical 
epistemology. In the 1960s and 1970s there was a convergence of such thinkers who attacked the notion of truth and 
objectivity. Some of the relevant authors in this regard were Thomas Kuhn, Michel Foucault, and Richard Rorty. 
These writers sought to replace “rational” approaches to science and other intellectual endeavors with political, 
military, and/or other “arational” models of cognitive affairs. This “debunking” social epistemology of the second 
half of the 20th century differs sharply from contemporary social epistemology. Contemporary social epistemology 
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rational, but they are also social. We believe, or disbelieve, a great deal of things based on the 
testimony of other persons we consider rational peers. A particular virtue needed for testimony to 
successfully transmit knowledge from one knower to another is trust.5 One must trust that the 
testimony she receives is reliable, well-informed, not overly biased, etc. – it needs to be the type 
of thing that can properly justify belief. With this outline of testimony in place, we may turn next 
to the second key element of social epistemology, namely: disagreement.  
If testimony is the right hand of our social theory of knowledge, then surely disagreement 
would be its left. (Perhaps we might say that disagreement is a type of testimony, or a subclass of 
testimony.) Disagreement is the phenomenon of two persons taking two different beliefs, or 
attitudes, or opinions that conflict with each other. They are inconsistent beliefs, such that it 
cannot be the case that both of them are true. Disagreement happens in at least two ways. The 
first way might be called mundane disagreement – ‘mundane’ in the sense that it’s 
philosophically uninteresting, for the most part. These are disagreements that happen because the 
two people who disagree with each other are not on the same intellectual level, or they aren’t 
equally well-informed, or one is being deliberately stubborn, or some regrettable combination of 
these. The patient who disagrees with the doctor’s advice, or the layman who disregards the 
opinion of the scientific expert, or the critic of some public policy who hasn’t fully or thoroughly 
                                                 
is largely continuous with classical epistemology. It sees no need to reject or distance itself from the epistemological 
projects of the past, and holds that social practices can be – and often are – aimed at finding the truth. Thus, the type 
of social epistemology one finds today in philosophical literature doesn’t call for any large-scale debunking of 
classical epistemology. Such epistemology can survive with an expanded conception of how the truth-goal can be 
served, namely, with the help of well-designed social and interpersonal practices and institutions. A major area of 
study in contemporary social epistemology revolves around the epistemology of testimony and the epistemology of 
disagreement. The years since 2000 have witnessed a surge of activity in these areas of social epistemology. The 
work in this thesis is a continuation of the work being done in contemporary social epistemology. For a full 
discussion of the development of social epistemology, see Alvin Goldman and Thomas Blanchard, “Social 
Epistemology,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 2015: URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/epistemology-social/>. 
 
5 Machuca, “Editor’s Introduction,” 2.    
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examined the pitfalls of removing the policy are engaging in mundane disagreements. They are 
mundane because we can explain why they occur and how to resolve them. They occur because 
one of the disagreeing parties is only superficially familiar with the evidence regarding the 
dispute, while his interlocutor is much more informed.6 Rationality would tell us that the less 
informed individual’s beliefs are subpar, or perhaps the process he went through in forming 
those beliefs is subpar (because he wasn’t thorough, or honest, etc.), and that he should show 
epistemic deference to the more informed person. If the poorly informed disputant familiarizes 
himself with the evidence he overlooked, it seems this would be one clear way to resolve the 
dispute. 
The second type of disagreement, which is the subject of the current literature on the 
epistemology of disagreement, concerns “epistemic peer disagreement.” Much of the literature 
concentrates on cases where one of the parties to a peer disagreement has good reason to think 
that the other person is roughly equally well-acquainted with the relevant evidence and 
arguments on the disputed issue.7 Along with being equally well-acquainted with the evidence, 
the disagreeing parties also have good reason to believe that the other person is just as competent 
at correctly evaluating the evidence and arguments of the relevant sort.8 Thus, in peer 
disagreements, the disagreeing parties are peers in an intellectual sense.  
Disagreement with intellectual peers happens frequently. Two expert weather forecasters 
disagree about the weekend forecast; two equally well-informed economists disagree about the 
                                                 
6 Or both disputants are ill-informed, and disagree with each other out of mutual ignorance.  
 
7 David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays (Oxford, 
United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1.  
 
8 Ibid.  
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most likely movement in interest rates.9 While it seems like two people who are just as 
competent, smart, well-informed, etc. should come to the same conclusions about questions in 
their domain of expertise, this is often not the case. So what are the epistemic consequences of 
peer disagreement? 
 Some philosophers think that general negative consequences result from peer 
disagreement; that some sort of substantial revision or suspension of belief is epistemically 
required in light of revealed peer disagreement.10 These philosophers advocate positions toward 
what might be called the “conciliatory” or “conformist” end of the spectrum. Since a 
disagreement with a peer is a disagreement with someone who is just as capable of making 
informed judgments as you are, you need to take a peer’s disagreement seriously, and think 
about whether it is reasonable to retain your belief in light of the disagreement. Those who hold 
to a conciliatory viewpoint will argue that upon learning that a peer disagrees with you about 
whether p, you cannot rationally continue to believe that p or to hold it to the same degree or 
with the same confidence; all the parties to the dispute are rationally required to significantly 
revise their beliefs.11 
 Other philosophers advocate positions toward what might be called the “steadfast” or 
“non-conformist” end of the spectrum. On their views, most of those holding opinions on 
disputed issues need not lower their confidence in a peer disagreement (unless there are non-
disagreement-related reasons for doing so).12 Steadfast-minded philosophers do not think that 
                                                 
9 Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 1.  
 
10 Ibid., 4.  
 
11 Machuca, “Editor’s Introduction,” 3.  
 
12 Christensen and Lackey, The Epistemology of Disagreement, 1.  
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there are general negative epistemic consequences that result from peer disagreement. Indeed, 
they think that there are no general epistemic consequences of disagreement.13 These 
philosophers are more inclined to think that you can justifiably stick to your beliefs in the face of 
some peer disagreements (though not necessarily all peer disagreements).14 
 Perhaps the most important (or a couple of the most important) and tricky questions about 
peer disagreement that need to be answered by both conciliatory and steadfast minded 
philosophers are these: given our understanding of epistemic peerhood and of what a peer 
disagreement involves, does it follow that at least one of the disagreeing parties must, because of 
the disagreement, revise her belief on pain of irrationality? Does it follow that at least one of the 
parties has an unjustified belief? Should we say that both disagreeing peers must revise and/or 
that both have unjustified beliefs?15 These questions point us in the direction of what the general 
epistemological problem of disagreement might be. The problem, stated all too broadly, is that 
it’s not clear just what the rational response to peer disagreement should be. This general 
problem of disagreement will be dealt with specifically as it shows up in the analysis of Richard 
Feldman’s position on disagreement.  
The Key Questions 
The previous section highlighted a few of the important general questions regarding the 
epistemic significance of disagreement. This section will outline the specific questions regarding 
disagreement to be dealt with in this thesis, which will center around Richard Feldman’s work on 
disagreement. The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate Feldman’s view on disagreement and the 
                                                 
13 Feldman and Warfield, Disagreement, 4.  
 
14 Ibid.  
 
15 Ibid., 3-4; Feldman and Warfield mention these questions as being key to the discussion on 
disagreement. 
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criticisms against his view. Over the last thirteen years or so, Feldman has argued for a 
conciliationist view on disagreement.16 He thinks that a peer disagreement counts as higher-
order, or second-order, evidence about the merits of the first-order evidence that each of the 
parties to the disagreement cites as supporting their conflicting beliefs. If one’s higher-order 
evidence indicates that the first-order evidence does not support a conclusion, then if one should 
respect the evidence, one should not maintain belief in that conclusion.17 Feldman takes it that a 
respected peer’s disagreement is a piece of higher-order evidence that undermines the 
justification one has for forming a belief on the basis of the first-order evidence.18 Because of 
this, the disputants will need to revise their original beliefs that were based on the first-order 
evidence. And by revising their beliefs, Feldman means that they will need to suspend judgment 
on the matter.19 
A central aspect of Feldman’s view is that there actually are epistemic peers – persons 
who share the same evidence and are equally intelligent – and this is why he thinks that peer 
disagreements count as higher-order evidence. If a peer disagreement happens, this lets us know 
that something isn’t right, because two epistemic peers wouldn’t disagree unless one of them had 
gone wrong in their reasoning somehow. However, some philosophers have argued against 
Feldman’s view by claiming that no two persons ever share all the same evidence, and this slight 
disparity of evidence accounts for why two peers might disagree. It is claimed that in a peer 
                                                 
16 One of Feldman’s first articles on disagreement was “Plantinga on Exclusivism” (Faith and Philosophy 
20, no. 1, 2003), where he argued that if a person has some good reasons to believe P, but also knows that other 
people have equally good reasons for believing things incompatible with P, and the person in question has no reason 
to discount their reasons and favor her own, then she is not justified in believing P (p. 88). 
 
17 Feldman, “Respecting the Evidence” (Philosophical Perspectives 19, no. 1, 2005), 100.  
 
18 Ibid., 103.  
 
19 Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” in Philosophers without Gods: Meditations on Atheism 
and the Secular Life, ed. Louise M. Antony (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 212.  
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disagreement each peer will have ‘private evidence’ that the other lacks. Such private evidence 
might be intuitions, background information, forgotten reasons, or something along these lines. 
Whatever it is, this private evidence tips the scale in favor of one’s own position in a peer 
disagreement, thus allowing two disagreeing peers to reasonably stick to their disputed beliefs.20 
If there is this private evidence, then Feldman’s claim that peer disagreements count as higher-
order evidence won’t go through, since it depends on the idea that peers share their evidence and 
that there is no evidential disparity between them. Thus, the first question to be dealt with in this 
thesis will be: does the notion of private evidence overturn Feldman’s claim that peer 
disagreements are higher-order evidence that count against the justification of the disputed 
beliefs? 
Another objection brought against Feldman’s notion that a peer disagreement is higher-
order evidence is this: since reasonable individuals generally evaluate their evidence correctly, 
the fact that a reasonable individual evaluates the evidence a certain way on a given occasion is 
higher-order evidence that that evidence in fact supports the conclusion he has drawn.21 In other 
words, higher-order evidence makes a difference about what one is justified in believing about 
one’s evidence, but it is not clear that such higher-order evidence has any justificatory impact 
regarding propositions not about one’s evidence.22  
According to Feldman, a peer disagreement is higher-order evidence that should lead one 
to reduce his confidence (or suspend judgment) in his disputed belief that p. But if the above 
claims about higher-order evidence are correct, then a peer disagreement doesn’t provide one 
                                                 
20 Feldman, “Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement,” in Epistemology Futures, ed. Stephen 
Hetherington (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 223. 
 
21 Jonathan Matheson, “Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence” (Episteme 6, no. 
3, 2009), 271.  
 
22 Ibid.  
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with higher-order evidence regarding p itself; rather, it merely provides one with higher-order 
evidence about the character of one’s first-order evidence.23 Thus, Feldman shouldn’t say that a 
peer disagreement is higher-order evidence showing that one’s disputed belief is unjustified and 
should be suspended. Instead, he should say that a peer disagreement is higher-order evidence 
about the status of the disagreeing peers’ first-order evidence, and this acknowledgement 
wouldn’t necessarily imply that the disagreeing individuals need to respond by suspending 
belief. Thus, the second question to be dealt with is this: if higher-order evidence is only 
evidence about the character of one’s first-order evidence, and not about the legitimacy of the 
belief that an individual has formed based on the first-order evidence, is Feldman justified in 
claiming that a peer disagreement is higher-order evidence that compels individuals to suspend 
their beliefs based on their first-order evidence?   
Finally, some object that even if a peer’s disagreement counts as higher-order evidence 
bearing on the justification of one’s disputed belief, it doesn’t follow that suspension of belief 
would be the mandated response. The line of thought motivating this criticism is that when a 
person is confident that his first-order evidence supports his belief that p, finding out that his 
peer disagrees doesn’t render the original first-order evidence irrelevant. If one’s belief that p 
was justified based on one’s first-order evidence, then it is likely that, in some cases, one’s belief 
that p will continue to be justified, even when we add the higher-order evidence of disagreement 
to the original first-order evidence. So the third question we will look at is: even if it is granted 
that a peer’s disagreement is higher-order evidence bearing on the reasonableness of one’s 
disputed belief itself, why should we think that the first-order evidence becomes no longer 
relevant and that the justification it originally provided for one’s disputed belief vanishes? 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 272.  
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These will be the central questions in my analysis of Feldman’s position. 
The Importance of Disagreement 
 The conclusion Feldman draws from his consideration of disagreement is, in a sense, 
skeptical. But it is not like the old and well-known skeptical conclusions with which 
epistemologists have battled time and again. The traditional battle with skepticism has to do with 
worries over whether it is possible for us to know about the existence and nature of things in the 
external world, or whether we can know about the future, or whether we can know about the 
past.24 Feldman looks at a different kind of skepticism, though – a kind that is less sweeping and, 
in a way, less remote from real world concerns than the more traditional kinds of skepticism. It is 
a familiar fact that there is widespread and robust disagreement about many of the most 
important issues in our intellectual lives. This is certainly true in philosophy. There is similar 
disagreement about religious matters, many scientific matters, and many issues of public policy. 
In each of these areas, informed and intelligent people disagree with one another. The question 
Feldman raises about disagreements like this concerns the reasonableness of maintaining your 
point of view in the light of such disagreements. Feldman’s conclusion will be that, more often 
than we might have thought, suspension of judgment is the epistemically proper attitude.25 
 If this is right, then it follows that in such cases we lack reasonable belief (and so, at least 
on standard conceptions, knowledge). This is a kind of contingent real-world skepticism that is 
                                                 
24 Feldman, “Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement,” 217.  
 
25 Ibid.  
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only lately beginning to receive the attention it deserves.26 Thinking about disagreement is 
important for a few different reasons, and its implications for skepticism is one of them.27 
Limits 
Disagreement seems to be a problem most perspicuously for evidentialists. Evidentialism 
is the thesis that a person is justified in believing a proposition if and only if the person’s 
evidence on balance supports that proposition.28 On evidentialism, knowledge and justification 
are matters of evidential support. The overarching question of this thesis concerns whether a 
peer’s disagreement constitutes a new piece of evidence, or higher-order evidence, that will 
significantly impact the justification (i.e., evidential support) of the belief one formed before 
finding out her peer disagrees with her. Accordingly, this thesis will examine how disagreement 
play’s out on an evidentialist understanding of knowledge and justification, and will ignore the 
implications disagreement might have for externalist accounts of knowledge and justification, 
like Alvin Goldman’s reliabilism or Alvin Plantinga’s conception of proper function.   
 The Claim to be Argued 
If the topic of this thesis were put into one sentence, one sentence describing the claim 
that this thesis seeks to think about, it might be this: a peer’s disagreement counts as evidence, 
evidence that undermines the justification for the belief about which your peer disagrees with 
                                                 
26 Ibid.  
 
27 Traditionally there were two major types of skepticism: Academic skepticism and Pyrrhonian skepticism. 
Academic (from Plato’s academy in ancient Greece) skepticism embodies a positive claim: we do not know there is 
a reality independent of our own immediate experience. Pyrrhonian (Pyrrho was an ancient skeptic) skepticism is 
more cautious, though. It does not deny that we have knowledge. Rather, it recommends suspension of judgment. It 
is the Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment that Feldman has in mind, it seems, when he speaks of the skepticism that 
results from peer disagreements. (This discussion of Academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism comes from Bernecker 
and Dretske, Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology, 301.)  
 
28 Richard Feldman, “Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement” (Episteme 6, no. 3, 2009), 
294.  
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you, and the only rational response when you find yourself in such a disagreement is to suspend 
belief on the disputed matter. This is Feldman’s claim. This is the claim that will be evaluated. I 
will argue that a peer’s disagreement should count as evidence that affects the justification of 
one’s disputed belief. I will also contend that the notion of ‘private evidence’ doesn’t 
successfully overturn Feldman’s view, and that the criticisms of Feldman’s view regarding the 
impact of higher-order evidence are wrongheaded as well. Finally, I hope to offer one or two 
thoughts on Feldman’s call for suspending judgment in peer disagreements. Some find the call 
for suspension troubling, but I don’t think it is. Thus, this thesis is really a defense of Feldman’s 
view. 
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Chapter 1: Feldman’s Conciliatory View 
 Introduction 
 Peter van Inwagen’s 1996 essay “It is Wrong, Always, Everywhere, and for Anyone, to 
Believe Anything, Upon Insufficient Evidence” has become a classic in the disagreement 
literature. In this essay van Inwagen reflects on his puzzlement over the fact that both he and 
David Lewis have protracted and unresolved disagreements over basic philosophical issues, 
despite the fact that both he and Lewis are equally intelligent philosophers. Van Inwagen asks:  
How can I believe (as I do) that free will is incompatible with determinism or that 
unrealized possibilities are not physical objects or that human beings are not four-
dimensional things extended in time as well as in space, when David Lewis – a 
philosopher of truly formidable intelligence and insight and ability – rejects these things I 
believe and is already aware of and understands perfectly every argument that I could 
produce in their defense?29 
 
Van Inwagen’s question here has been the fodder for a good bit of thinking aimed at tackling the 
problem of disagreement. But even after more than ten years have passed since van Inwagen first 
asked this question, he still confesses that he’s perplexed by the problem of disagreement. In his 
2010 essay “We’re Right, They’re Wrong” van Inwagen discusses the puzzles that disagreement 
continues to pose. At the end of this essay van Inwagen says that he is unable to give up many of 
his disputed beliefs, even though he knows that philosophers just as intelligent as himself 
disagree with his views. He is unable to accept the general conciliatory view that his disputed 
beliefs become less justified (because of disagreement) and that they need to be revised. And yet, 
while he is unable to give up his disputed beliefs, van Inwagen says, regarding the conciliatory 
                                                 
29 Van Inwagen, “It is Wrong, Always, Everywhere, and for Anyone, to Believe Anything, Upon 
Insufficient Evidence,” in Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today, eds. Jeff Jordan and 
Daniel Howard-Snyder (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 138.   
 14 
 
arguments for why his disputed beliefs are unjustified and need to be revised, “I am unable to 
answer them.”30 
 In the following explication of Richard Feldman’s view on disagreement – a conciliatory 
view – it is hoped that at least one or two of the reasons for why belief must be revised in peer 
disagreements, and that van Inwagen finds so unanswerable, will be brought into the light. 
 Evidentialism and Disagreement  
 Hume famously said that a wise man proportions his belief to the evidence. One can, 
perhaps, infer that Hume would also say that a wise man proportions his disbelief and his 
suspension of belief to the evidence, if called for, as well. It seems that no epistemological 
position has evidence more central to it than evidentialism.31 Evidentialism is the view that the 
epistemic justification of a belief is determined by the quality of the believer's evidence for the 
belief. 32 Evidentialism, at a minimum, says two things: 
 E1   Whether one is justified in believing p depends on one’s evidence regarding p. 
 E2   One’s evidence consists of one’s mental states.33  
We might call these the central principles of evidentialism regarding justification and evidence. 
According to Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, evidentialism is primarily a thesis about the 
nature of epistemic justification and secondarily a thesis about the nature of knowledge.34 The 
primary thesis holds that epistemic justification is a function of evidence: a person’s doxastic 
                                                 
30 van Inwagen, “We’re Right, They’re Wrong,” in Disagreement, eds. Richard Feldman and Ted A. 
Warfield (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010), 28.   
 
31 Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and Its Discontents (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 6. 
 
32 Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, “Evidentialism,” in Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology, eds. Earl 
Conee and Richard Feldman (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004), 83.  
 
33 Matthias Steup, “Epistemology,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
2014: URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/epistemology/>.   
 
34 Conee and Feldman, “Some Virtues of Evidentialism” (Veritas 50, no. 4, 2005), 95. 
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attitudes are epistemically justified if and only if they fit the evidence that the person has. The 
evidentialist thesis about knowledge is that justification, understood in evidentialist terms, is 
necessary for knowledge.35 In this discussion it is the evidentialist thesis about the nature of 
justification that will concern us for the most part.  
 The first central principle of evidentialism (E1 above) says that whether one is justified in 
believing some proposition depends on one’s evidence regarding that proposition. Belief, 
however, is only one doxastic attitude one can take toward some proposition. One may 
disbelieve the proposition in question. Or one may suspend judgment on it entirely. In order to 
include all the doxastic attitudes one might take toward some proposition, we can more 
thoroughly state the evidentialist principle regarding justification as follows: 
EJ   Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically justified for S at t if and 
only if having D toward p fits the evidence S has at t.36 
 
Conee and Feldman say that EJ indicates the kind of notion of justification that they take to be 
characteristically epistemic – a notion that makes justification turn entirely on evidence, rather 
than on the cognitive capacities of people, or upon the cognitive processes or information-
gathering practices that led one to a certain doxastic attitude.37  
 Conee and Feldman supply three examples that illustrate the application of the notion of 
justification in EJ. First, when a physiologically normal person under ordinary circumstances 
looks at a plush green lawn that is directly in front of her in broad daylight, believing that there is 
something green before her is the attitude toward this proposition that fits her evidence. That is 
                                                 
35 Ibid.  
 
36 Conee and Feldman, “Evidentialism,” 83.  
 
37 Ibid.  
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why the belief is epistemically justified. Second, suspension of judgment is the fitting attitude 
toward the proposition that an even number of ducks exists, since our evidence makes it equally 
likely that the number is odd. Neither belief nor disbelief is justified when our evidence is 
equally balanced. And third, when it comes to the proposition that sugar is sour, our gustatory 
experience makes disbelief the fitting doxastic attitude. Experiential evidence like this 
epistemically justifies disbelief.38 Thus, EJ asserts that the epistemic justification of an attitude 
depends only on evidence in this way. 
 What is evidence, though? The second key principle of evidentialism (E2 above) says 
that one’s evidence consists of one’s mental states. Trent Dougherty explains that this is so 
because if evidence consists in signs or indications of the way the world is, then ultimate 
evidence must come in the form of mental states with a certain kind of content.39 “The 
phenomenal content of mental states is what gives a mental state the kind of character to indicate 
to a person that something is thus-and-such,” says Dougherty. Because of this, it seems only 
mental states can serve as evidence in the relevant sense: ultimate indicators of the way the world 
is (‘ultimate’ in the sense that our experiences in the form of mental states are the only window 
on the world we have).40 
 Thus, evidentialism restricts a person’s evidence to the person’s mental states. Conee and 
Feldman point out that evidence in this sense is closely identified with reasons: the evidence one 
has consists in the reasons one has to go on in forming beliefs.41 These reasons include current 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 83-84. 
 
39 Dougherty, Evidentialism and Its Discontents, 4.  
 
40 Ibid.  
 
41 Conee and Feldman, “Some Virtues of Evidentialism,” 96.   
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experiential states, like those involved in perception, introspection, and occurrent memory. The 
experiential states that are the result of a priori reasoning can serve as evidence as well. Stored 
memories might also serve as evidence (though it may be difficult to specify which count as 
evidence).42 Conee and Feldman go on to explain that the word “reasons” is sometimes taken to 
apply only to believed propositions, not to the sorts of states just mentioned. But in their view, 
believed propositions need evidential support to serve as evidence.43 
 In its fundamental form, then, evidentialism is a supervenience thesis according to which 
facts about whether or not a person is justified in believing a proposition supervene on facts 
describing the evidence that the person has.44 If a person has good evidence for believing some 
proposition, then that person is justified in believing it – he has an epistemic right to hold that 
belief. How would an evidentialist look at the problem peer disagreement poses for the 
justification of disputed beliefs? Feldman says that the evidentialist view about disagreement is 
quite simple: “people are justified in believing what their evidence supports when they are 
involved in a disagreement.”45 Consider a person who believes p and learns that someone 
relevantly like himself (an epistemic peer) disbelieves p. The evidentialist view is that the person 
is justified in continuing to believe p if and only if the evidence the person has after learning of 
the disagreement on balance supports p. The person is justified in ceasing to believe p if and only 
if the evidence the person has after learning of the disagreement on balance does not support p.46 
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This much is trivially true, it seems, and all the philosophers who have worked on the problem of 
disagreement would agree with this sketch so far. The sticky issue is determining just how much 
of an evidential impact a peer’s disagreement has on a person’s disputed belief. Feldman, who 
espouses a conciliatory view on disagreement, thinks that evidence of peer disagreement is often 
“significant evidence against one’s own view.”47 To see why Feldman thinks a peer’s 
disagreement constitutes such counterevidence to one’s own view, we must look at the concept 
of higher-order evidence. 
 Higher-Order Evidence 
 Higher-order evidence is evidence about the existence, merits, or significance of a body 
of evidence.48 (The term ‘higher-order’ may be used interchangeably with ‘second-order’.) One 
example of higher-order evidence would be evidence that someone has unspecified evidence 
supporting some proposition. For instance, if someone tells you, “Jones has some evidence 
supporting P, but I don’t know what it is,” then you have some evidence about the existence of 
evidence for P.49 A second case of higher-order evidence is evidence that another person has a 
certain sort of evidence, you do know what it is, but you do not have the evidence yourself. 
Suppose someone looking at an object reports, “It looks blue to me.” You do not have any visual 
evidence that the object is blue, but you have some evidence about the existence of the other 
person’s visual evidence.50 A third case of higher-order evidence is the evidence one obtains 
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when one learns how someone else assesses a body of evidence – what that person thinks it 
supports.  
 A good bit of the controversy about peer disagreements turns on points about the 
epistemological significance of higher-order evidence. To illustrate how higher-order evidence 
plays into disagreement, Feldman distinguishes between three types of cases of disagreement: 
i. Evidential significance disagreements: disagreements in which the participants disagree  
      about the significance or evidential impact of a body of evidence.  
 
ii. Unspecified evidence disagreements: disagreements in which one learns that another  
      person has some unspecified evidence supporting a belief competing with one’s own       
      belief. 
 
iii. Specified evidence disagreements: disagreements in which one learns that another person  
has some specific evidence supporting a belief competing with one’s own belief (but does 
not acquire the person’s evidence).51 
 
Feldman says that evidential significance disagreements introduce a kind of puzzle that the latter 
two do not. The latter two disagreement cases are about how to weigh various bits and pieces of 
competing evidence.52 Evidential significance disagreements, however, introduce a different sort 
of issue. To Feldman, evidential significance disagreements are more puzzling than the others, 
and the second-order aspect is more significant. The central fact here is that the first-order 
evidence may actually support a proposition, and the disagreement provides evidence that the 
first-order evidence does not support that proposition. The question that then arises is what to 
make of the total evidence in such cases, says Feldman. 
 What impact does higher-order evidence about the merits of one’s first-order evidence 
have on the epistemic status of one’s first-order beliefs, exactly? To answer this question, 
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Feldman introduces the concept of ‘levels incongruity’. This concept can be characterized as 
follows: 
 Levels Incongruity: believing P while believing that your evidence does not support P, or  
believing P while considering the proposition that your evidence supports P and 
suspending judgment on that proposition.53 
 
The key issue with levels incongruity is whether these combinations of attitudes can be justified. 
Feldman thinks that this issue is brought into sharpest relief by consideration of cases in which 
one’s first-order evidence actually supports P, one believes P, and then one gets what would 
appear to be good reasons to doubt that the first-order evidence supports P. An example of this 
would be a case in which a valued and trusted peer makes a convincing case that your evidence 
does not support what you think it does. Feldman says that there are three views one might have 
about any such case:  
(1) One is justified in maintaining one’s belief that P and is justified in believing that the 
first-order evidence does support P (in spite of apparent reasons to the contrary). 
 
(2) One is justified in maintaining one’s belief that P and also justified in suspending 
judgment or in disbelieving that the first-order evidence supports P. 
 
(3) One is not justified in maintaining one’s belief that P and is justified in disbelieving or 
suspending judgment on the proposition that the first-order evidence supports P.54 
 
Feldman argues that it seems the only way to defend (1) in a particular case is by arguing that 
one is somehow automatically justified in believing the truth about the epistemic support relation 
in question. While one might hold that in certain cases these relations are “transparent” or a 
priori and that this implies that no evidence to the contrary can render one’s belief in such cases 
                                                 
53 Ibid., 307.  
 
54 Ibid.  
 
 21 
 
unjustified, this seems implausible. (1) assumes “a kind of impossibility to be led astray, a power 
that we just don’t have,” claims Feldman.55 
 Solution (2) introduces a kind of Moorean puzzle. While it isn’t logically inconsistent to 
have the attitudes one has in (2), it seems odd to maintain attitudes that have the kind of levels 
incongruity this implies. This view appears to imply that reflection on epistemic support relations 
has no impact on the justification of one’s first-order beliefs in these cases. But Feldman thinks 
this isolation of levels is a clear mistake. There would be something strange about criticizing a 
person who justifiably believes that his evidence does not support a proposition for not believing 
that proposition.56 
 This leaves response (3). Feldman thinks (3) is a plausible response in those cases in 
which the evidence does make disbelieving or suspending judgment on the evidential support 
proposition reasonable. To defend (3) as the right response does not imply that it is reasonable to 
disbelieve or suspend judgment simply because a peer asserts that one’s own assessment of the 
evidence is incorrect. It may be that whatever evidence comes from one’s own reflection on the 
topic often carries more evidential weight. And (3) does not amount to arguing that the original 
evidence should be ignored. The idea isn’t that one has to weigh the original evidence supporting 
the proposition against the higher-order evidence that goes against the proposition. Rather, the 
higher-order evidence serves as a defeater of the original evidence, in the sense that the 
conjunction of the original evidence and the higher-order evidence fails to support the 
proposition. Thus, Feldman concludes that evidence that one is in an evidential significance 
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disagreement with a peer does provide significant evidence that will, in general, undermine a 
belief that is in fact supported by one’s original first-order evidence.57 
Epistemic Peerhood 
 We concluded in the previous section that a trusted peer’s disagreement constitutes some 
evidence against one’s own view. More exactly, a peer’s disagreement provides significant 
evidence that can undermine one’s own belief. Why is a peer’s disagreement judged to be so 
significant? To answer this question we must discuss the notion of epistemic peerhood. In the 
literature on peer disagreement the concept of “epistemic peerhood” plays a central role. In an 
attempt to regiment the philosophical discussion of disagreement, those addressing this 
epistemological issue usually assume that the agents in question are peers in a specific semi-
technical sense.58 In the stipulative sense of “peer” that has been introduced in this discussion, 
peers literally share all evidence and are equal with respect to their abilities and dispositions 
relevant to interpreting that evidence.59 This idealization of epistemic peerhood is useful for 
helping us to think about a large number of the cases that motivate reflection on the 
epistemology of peer disagreement. Of course, in actual cases there will rarely be exact equality 
of evidence and abilities, though.  
Since it is granted that no two actual peers ever meet this idealized standard of epistemic 
peerhood, philosophers have typically said that epistemic peers are, from a more realistic 
perspective, two persons who are acquainted with the available pertinent evidence and arguments 
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to roughly the same extent, and possess similar cognitive virtues or skills.60 David Christensen 
defines an epistemic peer as someone who you have good reason to think is as intelligent and 
rational as yourself, and you have no general reason to think that either of you is especially likely 
to be good or bad at reacting to evidence on the particular matter at hand.61 Feldman defines 
epistemic peers as individuals who are roughly equal with respect to intelligence, reasoning 
powers, background information, and so on.62  
Thus, while we have an idealized notion of what an epistemic peer is, we do not have a 
precise notion of what a real-life epistemic peer is. But a precise definition isn’t necessarily 
needed. To say that a peer is one who shares roughly the same evidence and intellectual abilities 
is sufficient for a discussion of the evidential impact of a peer disagreement. This is why 
Feldman says that “in any realistic case, when we encounter someone who is more or less like 
us, disagreement will have some evidential impact, and how much impact it will have will 
depend upon the details of the situation.”63 What really matters, ultimately, is how credible the 
person is on the topic of the disagreement.64 
Since in peer disagreements an epistemic peer is someone just as good as oneself in the 
relevant respects, it seems one must take his disagreeing peer’s opinion quite seriously. After all, 
when peers disagree we know that at least one of them is mistaken (or both are), but we don’t 
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know which, since both are equally likely to have correct or justified beliefs – both are on a par 
with one another intellectually.65 This is why a peer’s disagreement constitutes evidence that 
impacts the justification of one’s own view. A disagreeing peer’s report constitutes testimonial 
evidence about what it is reasonable for one to believe. 
The Appeal to Symmetry 
Given how peers are roughly equals intellectually, a key characteristic of peer 
disagreements surfaces at this point: namely, symmetry. In a peer disagreement, the participants 
should realize that for each thing one of them can say in support of his view, the other can say 
something analogous in support of the other view.66 To stick to one’s guns in such a 
disagreement is to fail to treat like cases alike. “It is a violation of what I take to be a clear 
condition for rational belief,” says Feldman.67 The violation of the requirement to treat like cases 
alike might be clarified in the following way. Consider the perspective of a neutral third person 
observing a peer disagreement. That person might see the argument as a draw, with 
considerations on each side that balance each other out. It is hard to see why what is justified for 
a participant in the disagreement differs at all from what is justified for this observer. Compare a 
case in which you have competing testimony from two experts and you reasonably suspend 
judgment about the matter in question. It is hard to see why one of the experts would be justified 
in sticking to his view simply because it is his view.68 
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 Thus, in peer disagreements where the peers are both just as sensible, serious, and careful 
in evaluating the arguments and evidence, where there are not any evident asymmetries between 
them, it seems it would be unreasonable to say that the point of view of one peer on the matter is 
somehow privileged, such that he can rationally continue holding his belief despite his peer’s 
disagreement.69 If we are to take a peer’s disagreement seriously, then we must acknowledge that 
a peer’s disagreement counts against our own view. It is for these reasons that Feldman 
concludes that a peer’s disagreement is higher-order evidence that undermines the justification 
for both the original object level conclusion (i.e., one’s original belief before finding out one’s 
peer disagreed) and for the proposition that the first-order evidence supports that conclusion.70 
Conclusion: Respect the Evidence and Suspend Judgment 
 If a peer’s disagreement undermines the justification of one’s disputed belief, then what 
is the rational response one should take when he finds himself in such a disagreement? 
Feldman’s answer is that one must respect the evidence. Perhaps one’s first-order evidence 
seems to support the belief that p. But learning that one’s peer disbelieves that p is higher-order 
evidence that undercuts one’s justification for believing that p.71 Because of this, the original 
belief that p is no longer justified. To respect the evidence in cases like this is to acknowledge 
that one’s disputed belief is no longer justified – one no longer has a right to hold it.  
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 When you find yourself in the place where your disputed belief is no longer justified, it 
seems a kind of compromise with your disagreeing peer is in order – rationality would tell us that 
some kind of conciliation needs to happen. The compromise Feldman calls for is suspension of 
belief. The considerations of higher-order evidence and the symmetry present in peer 
disagreements should lead us to recognize that giving up one’s belief – suspending judgment – is 
the proper response called for. Suspending belief in this way is a kind of epistemic modesty in 
response to disagreement with one’s peers. And it is also a kind of skepticism, in the limited 
sense that it denies the existence of reasonable or justified beliefs in cases of peer 
disagreement.72 Feldman concludes that his view on disagreement, which calls for suspending 
judgment, implies that “we may have less knowledge, or fewer justified beliefs, than we might 
have otherwise thought. It seems to have the discouraging implication that thinking about 
epistemology, and conversing with intelligent people who disagree with us, can undermine the 
justification we have for our beliefs. On reflection, however, that result strikes me as being 
exactly right.”73 
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Chapter 2: Objections to Feldman’s Position 
Introduction 
In his Discourse on Method, Descartes said, “The diversity of our opinions . . . does not 
arise from some being endowed with a larger share of reason than others, but solely from this, 
that we conduct our thoughts along different ways, and do not fix our attention on the same 
objects.”74 Descartes’ observation seems to lend support to the idea that there can be reasonable 
disagreements. Two persons reasonably disagree about a proposition when they disagree about 
that proposition, and they are reasonable, or justified, in their differing doxastic attitudes toward 
that proposition; two persons have a reasonable disagreement about a proposition when they 
reasonably disagree about that proposition, and it is mutual knowledge between them that they 
disagree about that proposition.75 
Richard Feldman doesn’t think that epistemic peers can have reasonable disagreements. 
He says, “[I]t cannot be that epistemic peers who have shared their evidence can reasonably 
come to different conclusions.”76 This is because when two peers who are equally intelligent and 
competent disagree, it signals that one of them must be making some kind of mistake or failing 
to see some truth. At least one of them has an unjustified belief, or an unreasonable belief, not 
supported by the available evidence. Since the disagreeing peers can’t tell which of them has the 
unjustified belief, both should suspend judgment on the matter. 
In this chapter we will consider two objections to Feldman’s view. The first turns on the 
idea of private evidence; the second on how to properly understand the impact of higher-order 
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evidence. The aim of both objections is to show that epistemic peers can have reasonable 
disagreements, contra Feldman. We turn to a discussion of these objections next. 
The Objection from Private Evidence 
 According to Feldman, peer disagreements can be divided into two stages. The first stage 
is isolation.77 In this stage, two peers have examined similar bodies of evidence and, after careful 
thought, one of them comes to the conclusion that P is true and the other comes to the conclusion 
that P is not true. To each individual, the conclusion arrived at seems clearly true. At this point 
the two peers are aware that they disagree, but they haven’t discussed their particular reasons that 
led them to differing conclusions.  
The second stage is full disclosure.78 In this stage, both persons have thoroughly 
discussed the issues. They know each other’s reasons and arguments, and know that the other 
person has come to a competing conclusion after examining the same evidence.79 Even after 
disclosing their reasons, it often happens that the disagreement persists and remains unresolved. 
The stage of full disclosure is most important. Feldman argues that if the peers still disagree after 
full disclosure, then the only reasonable thing is for them to suspend judgment.  
In his chapter “The Epistemology of Disagreement” in a recent volume on social 
epistemology, Ernest Sosa says that he agrees with Feldman about this. If full disclosure takes 
                                                 
77 Richard Feldman, “Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement,” in Epistemology Futures, ed. Stephen 
Hetherington (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 220.  
 
78 Ibid.  
 
79 Feldman explains that there are intermediate situations in which the various pieces of evidence and the 
arguments are partially shared. Indeed, almost any realistic disagreement is somewhere between isolation and full 
disclosure. Nonetheless, it’s still useful to think about the extreme situations. For Feldman’s discussion of this see 
“Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement,” 219-220.  
 
 29 
 
place and the disagreement persists, then both parties need to withhold belief.80 But Sosa isn’t 
quick to agree that full disclosure truly takes place in peer disagreements. One thing in particular 
hinders the full disclosure condition from being satisfied: namely, the presence of private 
evidence. 
Some philosophers, like Sosa, argue that there are two important types of evidence at 
work in peer disagreements: public evidence and private evidence.81 Distinguishing between 
these two types of evidence is necessary in thinking about whether a person can reasonably 
sustain his disputed belief in a peer disagreement. Public evidence is evidence that is available to 
all persons involved in the dispute. While public evidence is important, the final judgments made 
by each participant in a disagreement are not based solely on this public evidence. Such 
judgments are based also on personal beliefs to which only each participant has access, i.e., 
private evidence.82 
Sosa speaks of private evidence as a reason or set of reasons an individual possesses that 
cannot be expounded or explicated fully – either to the individual himself or to someone else – 
because those reasons are too extensive or complex. Private evidence is inscrutable, or 
sufficiently hard to uncover (for whatever reason), or too subtle to be noticed and detailed 
fully.83 Why is it that one’s reasons might be hidden in this way? Sosa argues that many of our 
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reasons that originally justified our currently held beliefs are far removed in our past, or deeply 
lodged in our subconscious, and so cannot be uncovered for critical inspection.84 In other words, 
a good bit of the relevant evidence that an individual possesses (and that justifies his beliefs) is 
reflectively inaccessible, since it lies in the past and is no longer operative except indirectly 
through retained beliefs. When our grounding for a belief is complex and temporally extended 
with the aid of memory in this way, it lies beyond our grasp, beyond our present view.  
Speaking about how private evidence influences our beliefs on matters of controversy, 
Sosa explains:  
Our basis for believing as we do on such questions generally fails to be fully formed and 
operative in one fell swoop. Light dawns gradually over such questions. A belief forms in 
us over time through the subtle influence of diverse sources. Some are testimonial, others 
perceptual, others inferential, and so on. The belief might owe importantly to the 
believer’s upbringing, or to later influence by his community. We are social beings and 
do well, socially and intellectually, to rely on such influence by our social and intellectual 
communities. Such proper reliance over time on divergent communities might thus help 
explain how disagreement can be reasonable.85 
 
Thus, the reasons why we believe as we do are often not transparent to us and cannot be made 
fully transparent to us by any amount of further inquiry, since the evidence that supports the 
formation of our beliefs is progressively discarded or otherwise forgotten.86 Given these 
considerations about the inscrutability of reasons and evidence, does it provide us with good 
reason to think Feldman’s full disclosure requirement is unrealistic or wrongheaded? Sosa thinks 
it does. If each party to a disagreement has private evidence that cannot be disclosed, then two 
disagreeing peers will actually have two different sets of evidence. Their shared public evidence 
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will be the same, but their private reasons justifying their conflicting conclusions will be 
different, thus making it possible for epistemic peers to have reasonable disagreements. 
Perhaps one might find it odd that a set of inscrutable reasons can justify a person’s belief 
about something. To further explicate the concept of private evidence and defend his use of it in 
disagreements, Sosa appeals to G.E. Moore’s disagreement with the skeptic, which will be the 
subject of the next section. 
The Moorean Analogue 
 In his 1939 paper “Proof of an External World” G.E. Moore attempted to demonstrate 
that there is a world of external objects. Moore argued that he could prove the existence of two 
human hands by holding up both his hands and saying “here is one hand” and “here is another.” 
This proves the existence of external objects. The skeptic, however, would disagree with 
Moore’s conclusion. There are two points over which Moore and the skeptic disagree. The first 
disagreement concerns whether Moore can know there is a hand before him. Moore argues that 
he does know this, while the skeptic denies he can know this. The skeptic claims that Moore 
cannot know this because Moore cannot rule out the possibility that he might be dreaming.  
The question of whether Moore might be dreaming is the second disagreement. Moore 
responds to this charge by saying he knows he’s not dreaming because he knows about the 
existence of the hand. So Moore’s rejection of the skeptic’s side on this second disagreement 
about dreaming is based on his insistence that he is right in the first disagreement about the 
hand.87 Sosa says Moore “bases his rejection, in other words, precisely on insisting that he is 
right in the earlier disagreement and the sceptic wrong.”88 In both the disagreements Moore has 
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with the skeptic, Moore insists on his conclusions by downgrading the skeptic’s judgment. 
Moore thinks that the skeptic must be going wrong somehow, since it is more certain that he, 
Moore, does know about his hand and the fact that he’s not dreaming than is anything the skeptic 
can adduce against those facts. Is Moore justified in responding to the skeptic this way? That 
depends on whether private evidence is at work in the disagreement between Moore and the 
skeptic. 
Note that Moore doesn’t reject the skeptic’s view because Moore thinks it’s obvious or a 
self-evident truth that he is awake and not dreaming, so that he needs no ulterior reasons for so 
believing. On the contrary, Sosa says that Moore is quite explicit that it is only based on 
conclusive reasons that he knows himself to be awake and not dreaming.89 However, Moore 
claims that he cannot expound those reasons fully, perhaps because they are too extensive and 
complex. And Moore’s reasons are said to constitute ‘conclusive evidence’ for believing that he 
is awake and not dreaming despite his inability to expound them. Thus, Moore cannot cite his 
reasons to an opponent or lay them out one by one, but he thinks his reasons for believing as he 
does are conclusive nonetheless. 
Moore doesn’t explain what he might include in such conclusive evidence. Sosa thinks 
that one might reasonably attribute to Moore considerations of the sort that seem compelling to 
Descartes and J.L. Austin. For Descartes, wakeful experience has a kind of coherence that 
distinguishes it from dreams; for Austin, dreams have a dream-like quality that makes for a 
similar distinction. Regarding these considerations, Sosa says: 
Indeed, the distinctions are at bottom the same if what underlies the dream-like quality is 
just the absence of the coherence that for Descartes distinguishes our wakeful 
consciousness (often enough, at least when rich enough). Any case of wakeful experience 
rich enough to have Descartes’s coherence and to avoid Austin’s dreaminess, would be 
                                                 
 
89 Ibid.  
 33 
 
constituted specifically by some complex stream of consciousness composed of elements 
that dovetail appropriately with others in the same time slice and also with preceding and 
succeeding elements. Each such fact of dovetailing presumably contributes to the 
coherence of the stream of consciousness, and may constitute a ‘reason’ which, when 
combined with all the others, provides a conclusive justifying basis for the subject’s 
belief that he is then awake. Each is thus operative as a partial basis for that belief, but 
Moore apparently believes that this does not require the subject’s ability to detail each 
separately, so as to enable a proof that he could cite to himself or to others.90 
 
If the above considerations are right, then Moore does know - based on evidence in his 
possession that cannot, perhaps, be fully expounded – that he is awake and not dreaming, despite 
the skeptic’s disagreement.  
Sosa argues that Moore’s disagreement with the skeptic is helpful for thinking about 
cases of peer disagreement. In Moore’s case, he is unsure of having fully expounded his 
evidence, but he takes his evidence to be sufficient to justify his belief in an external world and 
to justify his belief that he is awake and not dreaming. Moore thinks his ‘conclusive reasons’ are 
more epistemically weighty than the skeptic’s disagreement, even though those reasons cannot 
be fully disclosed. Similarly, in peer disagreements the evidence on which the parties base belief 
in their side of the controversy is often inscrutable, or at least sufficiently hard to uncover. If the 
evidence is this way, at least in part, then it cannot be displayed for reflection on how well it 
supports the content of the disagreeing peers’ beliefs.91  
Why some of the evidence in peer disagreements might be private or inscrutable recalls 
Moore’s example, where even though the evidence may be right there in one’s present conscious 
experience or remembered directly from one’s recent experience, it is too subtle or too complex 
to be noticed and detailed fully. While the relevant past experiences that prompted and grounded 
one’s beliefs were originally in one’s conscious awareness, those justifying grounds eventually 
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slip out of sight. Then one’s beliefs based on those grounds are kept in place through the proper 
operation of retentive memory, while the grounds are not. It is this latter time- and memory-
involving rational basis that need not now be present to our reflective gaze in order to do its 
proper epistemic work. Because of this, Sosa says, “The idea that we can always or even often 
spot our operative ‘evidence’ for examination is a myth.”92 
Thus, in peer disputes the disagreeing peers are in the position that Moore takes himself 
to be in with the skeptic. In the case of the disagreeing peers, each have their own reasons (in 
their case through the mediation of retentive memory) that, acting in concert, across time, have 
motivated their present beliefs. But they are in no position to detail these reasons fully. And this 
may be so, as Moore also thought, even in cases where the reasons, in combination, are quite 
conclusive.  
Upshot: Reasonable Peer Disagreements 
Sosa thinks that Moore’s case illustrates the idea that one’s belief may be epistemically 
justified even though one is unable to cite the reasons that ground that belief to others, or even to 
oneself. There are two implications and one qualification that Sosa draws from this conclusion. 
First, if private evidence plays the role that Sosa (and Moore) thinks it does in 
disagreements, then this implies that an individual may justifiably downgrade his peer in a 
disagreement. To downgrade a peer is just to think that one’s peer must be going wrong 
somehow on that particular issue. Since it will be relatively rare for two disagreeing peers to be 
able to fully disclose their reasons and evidence, then neither peer is privy to the backing for 
their opponent’s contrary belief – not fully, anyways. So each peer might be quite reasonably 
confident of the competence that they themselves exercise on the disputed issue, while they 
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won’t be as confident that their peer is exercising the same level of competence. Thus, because 
of the private evidence each peer possesses, they have reason to give greater weight to their own 
opinion than they do to their peer’s. This is why they might properly downgrade their opponent 
based essentially on the substance of their disagreement.93 
 The second implication of the presence of private evidence in peer disagreements is that 
reasonable peer disagreements are possible. Recall that Feldman claimed, and Sosa agreed, that 
two peers can’t both be justified in their disputed beliefs in a peer disagreement – i.e., reasonably 
disagree – if full disclosure takes place. But Sosa’s emphasis on the importance of hidden 
reasons shows that, as in Moore’s case, our ability to fully disclose our reasons may be quite 
limited. This in turn implies that even if reasonable disagreement with full disclosure is 
impossible, this has little bearing on the possibility of reasonable peer disagreements, since full 
disclosure might be difficult and rare.94 In any realistic peer disagreement then, two peers will 
have different bodies of evidence, even if the difference is only slight. Part of each peer’s body 
of evidence will not be open to inspection. This evidential disparity is sufficient, Sosa argues, to 
make room for reasonable peer disagreement.95 
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The evidential disparity in peer disagreements caused by private evidence further implies that disagreeing 
peers aren’t intellectual peers in a robust sense at all, since they don’t share the same body of evidence. If two 
supposed peers aren’t fully epistemic peers, then Sosa would argue that Feldman can’t draw any general conclusions 
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 Lastly, Sosa adds one qualification to his objection from private evidence, namely: in 
arguing that some of our reasons might be hidden or inscrutable, Sosa isn’t endorsing a kind of 
obscurantism where the only way to defend our ability to take reasonable stances on 
controversial topics is by removing the topics from the arena of proper debate and critical 
reflection. Sosa explains, “Even if a controversial view that one upholds is justified by much that 
is then reflectively inaccessible, this by itself need not free one from full responsibility for 
providing a supporting rationale.”96 Sosa isn’t clear on what this supporting rationale would look 
like exactly. But perhaps that’s a secondary matter, since the main point Sosa wishes to make is 
that we shouldn’t take his view to imply that our reasons are off limits to critical inspection. 
 The Objection from Higher-Order Considerations 
 Feldman argues that a peer’s disagreement has an impact on the justificatory status of 
one’s disputed belief. Consider the case in which a person believes that p on the basis of her 
first-order evidence. She then finds out that her epistemic peer disbelieves p on the basis of the 
same first-order evidence. To Feldman, the fact that one’s peer disagrees constitutes higher-order 
evidence that undermines the justification of one’s belief that p, which was based on the first-
order evidence. So, on Feldman’s view, second-level information can defeat the initial object-
level belief, and it does so in cases of peer disagreement.97  
 Thomas Kelly denies this. In both his 2005 essay “The Epistemic Significance of 
Disagreement” and his 2010 essay “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” Kelly 
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outlines what he takes to be the proper conception of higher-order evidence and how higher-
order evidence functions in peer disagreements. There are two criticisms that Kelly makes 
against conciliatory views like Feldman’s.98 The first is that Feldman misconstrues how higher-
order evidence works. The second is that even if higher-order evidence functions the way 
Feldman claims it does, it wouldn’t follow that parties to a peer disagreement need to suspend 
judgment. Both of these objections come from Kelly’s 2005 essay mentioned above. I’ll lay out 
these objections here. In the next chapter, I will note some changes Kelly has made to these 
objections in his 2010 essay, and I will address both the original and revised objections. Before 
turning to Kelly’s original objections here, I will sketch what he takes to be the proper 
understanding of higher-order evidence and the role it plays in peer disagreements. 
 The Backdrop 
To Kelly, a piece of higher-order evidence provides one with evidence about what one’s 
evidence supports. While different things can function as higher-order evidence, the type of 
higher-order evidence that will concern us here is the beliefs of reasonable individuals. In 
general, we take it that reasonable persons typically respond to their evidence correctly. Given 
that reasonable individuals are disposed to respond correctly to their evidence, the fact that a 
reasonable individual responds to her evidence in one way rather than another is itself evidence; 
it is evidence about her evidence.99 In other words, the fact that a generally reasonable individual 
                                                 
98 Kelly makes these objections to conciliatory views in general, and they are not specifically directed 
toward Feldman. But since the objections given by Kelly that we are focusing on are directed at those who think 
disagreement provides a good reason for skepticism or to change one’s original view, Feldman is certainly one of 
the persons Kelly has in mind. 
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believes hypothesis H on the basis of evidence E is some evidence that it is reasonable to believe 
H on the basis of E. 
So, the beliefs of a reasonable individual will constitute higher-order evidence, evidence 
about the character of one’s first-order evidence. Such higher-order evidence, like most other 
evidence, will not be conclusive evidence. For instance, a generally reasonable individual may 
mistakenly believe H on the basis of E, while, in fact, E does not adequately support H. In that 
case, the fact that the reasonable individual believes as she does constitutes misleading evidence 
about the character of the evidence E. But in general, the fact that a reasonable person believes H 
on the basis of E constitutes evidence about the character of E.100 
The existence of such higher-order evidence is important because it works as a corrective, 
almost. We are fallible with respect to our ability to correctly appreciate our evidence, says 
Kelly.101 While it’s understood that reasonable individuals tend to respond correctly to their 
evidence, even generally reasonable individuals are susceptible to making mistakes on particular 
occasions. This is why higher-order evidence is helpful to fallible epistemic agents. It allows one 
to take a step back from one’s first-order evidence and see if the belief based on the first-order 
evidence is well-founded. 
Applying the above considerations to disagreement, Kelly says there are two types of 
evidence at work in peer disagreements: higher-order evidence and first-order evidence. Kelly 
speaks of these two types of evidence as ‘psychological evidence’ and ‘non-psychological 
evidence’, respectively. Facts about the distribution of opinion among epistemic peers in a 
disagreement is the psychological, or higher-order, evidence, and the original evidence on which 
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the peers base their opinions is the non-psychological evidence.102 Kelly explains that given the 
general reasonableness of one’s epistemic peers, what they believe on the basis of one’s shared 
evidence will constitute evidence about what it is reasonable to believe on the basis of that 
evidence. While this is the case, Kelly argues that it’s not clear how one should integrate these 
higher-order considerations into one’s own deliberations and what difference such considerations 
make to what it is reasonable for one to believe.103  
It seems that evidence about one’s evidence will make a difference to what it is 
reasonable for one to believe about one’s evidence. This is the main function and significance of 
higher-order evidence, to Kelly – it is to provide a commentary on what it is reasonable for one 
to believe about one’s evidence. However, Kelly doesn’t think it’s obvious that such higher-
order considerations also make a difference to what it is reasonable for one to believe about 
propositions that are not about one’s evidence. In particular, Kelly thinks one misuses higher-
order evidence when one claims that higher-order information can undermine the justification of 
an object-level belief that was based on one’s first-order evidence. This leads us to Kelly’s first 
objection to Feldman. 
A Misuse of Higher-Order Evidence 
Kelly’s first objection is that Feldman misunderstands the significance and impact of 
higher-order evidence. To repeat, higher-order evidence is evidence about one’s first-order 
evidence, according to Kelly. When properly understood, higher-order evidence makes a 
difference regarding what one is justified in believing about one’s evidence. To illustrate this, 
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suppose that two epistemic peers share the same total evidence E with respect to some 
hypothesis H. Then consider this proposition: 
(1) E is good evidence that H is true. 
If one peer discovers that the other believes that H on the basis of E, he should treat that 
discovery as confirming evidence for (1). But should he also treat that discovery as confirming 
evidence for H itself? Conversely, suppose that one peer discovers that the other believes that 
not-H on the basis of E. This discovery would constitute disconfirming evidence for (1). Would 
it also constitute a defeater for H? 
 Kelly would argue that, if one holds to a view like Feldman’s, one would answer both of 
these questions affirmatively. On Feldman’s view, a peer’s disagreement constitutes evidence 
that defeats the justification of one’s disputed belief which is based on the first-order evidence. 
However, Kelly thinks this line of thought is misguided. To see Kelly and Feldman’s 
disagreement more sharply, consider the following. Kelly would affirm this definition of higher-
order evidence: 
(2) Higher-order evidence is simply evidence about one’s first-order evidence E. 
Feldman, however, would affirm a more encompassing notion of higher-order evidence, namely: 
(3) Higher-order evidence is evidence about one’s first-order evidence E and is also 
evidence about the reasonableness of one’s belief that H based on evidence E. 
 
It is the second conjunct in (3) that Kelly rejects. 
Kelly offers two reasons for thinking that we should not treat the higher-order evidence 
for or against (1) that is afforded by one of the peers believing as they do as evidence for or 
against the reasonableness of believing H itself. Kelly’s first reason is the following: 
Imagine that I have yet to make up my mind about H: that is, I am in the process of 
actively deliberating about what attitude I should take up towards the hypothesis. 
Suppose further that I find that you believe H on the basis of our shared first-order 
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evidence E. If I treat the fact that you believe as you do as an additional piece of evidence 
which bears on the truth of H, then, when I enumerate the considerations which tend to 
confirm H, I will list not only the various first-order considerations that speak in favor of 
H, but also the fact that you believe that H is true . . . But notice that, when you 
enumerate the reasons why you believe that H is true, you will list the various first-order 
considerations that speak in favor of H – but presumably, not the fact that you yourself 
believe that H is true. From your perspective, the fact that you believe as you do is the 
result of your assessment of the probative force of the first-order evidence: it is not one 
more piece of evidence to be placed alongside the rest.104  
 
Kelly’s observation here highlights a crucial point about what one counts as evidence. If we were 
to ask a person why he believes H on the basis of evidence E, he probably wouldn’t cite the fact 
that he believes H as evidence for H. Rather, as Kelly observes, from the person’s perspective his 
belief in H seems to simply be a result of the evidence, not one more piece of it. If the person 
himself wouldn’t count his belief that H as part of his evidence, then his peer shouldn’t count it 
either.105  
Thus, when the individual first came to believe that H on the basis of his initial 
considerations of the first-order evidence E, he did not then proceed to treat the fact that he 
believes that H is true as a reason to increase his confidence that H is true. Rather, he arrived at 
that level of confidence which he thought appropriate simply given the first-order evidence E.106 
Similarly, if one of the parties to the disagreement subsequently changed his mind and came to 
doubt that the first-order evidence was sufficient to rationalize his believing H, he would not 
treat the fact that he originally believed that H as a reason to continue believing it. And so, a 
peer’s belief shouldn’t count as higher-order evidence that bears on the justification of one’s 
belief in H. 
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Kelly’s first reason, then, for why we shouldn’t think of someone’s believing H as further 
evidence for H itself is that a person in a peer disagreement who believes H does not treat the 
fact that he himself believes H as a further reason to believe that H, above and beyond the first-
order considerations that the person takes to rationalize his belief. 
Kelly’s second reason for why we shouldn’t think of someone’s believing H as further 
evidence for H itself is this: if we were to count the fact that one believes H as a further piece of 
evidence supporting H, then this would be to engage in a kind of double-counting. This train of 
thought is similar to the idea that the fact that one believes H is simply a result of the force of the 
first-order evidence and not another piece of it.107 Kelly claims that if we were to count the first-
order evidence and one’s belief that H is true, we would be counting that first-order evidence 
twice, since the person’s belief that H is true is something like a marker or place-holder for that 
first-order evidence.108  
 This second reason of Kelly’s for why we shouldn’t think of someone’s believing H as 
further evidence for H is closely related to the first reason. If we suppose that a peer’s believing 
H is further evidence for H, then the other party to this peer disagreement is in the awkward 
position of treating his peer’s belief that H as a reason to believe that H, despite the fact that his 
peer himself doesn’t treat this as an epistemically relevant consideration. Kelly notes that it 
might make sense for a person to treat his peer’s belief in this way if he lacked access to his 
peer’s first-order evidence, since in that case his peer’s belief would stand in as a sort of proxy 
for the evidence on which it is based. But when a person has access to his peer’s first-order 
evidence for H, and he continues to treat the belief that his peer has formed in response to that 
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evidence as a further reason to believe that H, it seems like that person is engaged in double-
counting with respect to the relevant evidence.109 
 Therefore, Kelly doesn’t think that someone’s believing (or disbelieving) H should count 
as further evidence for (or against) H itself, since (i) the person who believes H wouldn’t count 
that as an additional reason supporting H, and (ii) to take one’s peer’s belief that H as further 
evidence for H is to engage in a sort of double-counting.  
At the very least then, there seems to be a certain oddness in a person giving additional 
weight to his peer’s belief that H is true when the person has already taken into account all of 
those considerations on which his peer’s belief is based, considerations that seem to exhaust the 
case for H. While Feldman claims that a peer’s disagreement is higher-order evidence that 
undermines the justification of one’s disputed belief, Kelly finds this implausible. To think this is 
to misunderstand the function of higher-order evidence.  
 First-Order Evidence vs. Higher-Order Evidence 
 Kelly’s second objection to Feldman’s position is that, even if we do treat the higher-
order evidence that is provided by the views of our epistemic peers as further evidence that bears 
on the disputed questions themselves, discovering that one’s peer disagrees does not entail that 
one ceases to be justified in believing what one does. In other words, discovering such a 
disagreement does not mandate suspension of belief regarding the disputed proposition. Kelly’s 
argument goes as follows. Let E represent the total evidence you and I (epistemic peers) have 
with respect to H at time t0. Suppose that each of us is ignorant of the other’s existence at this 
point. Let’s further stipulate that E is such as to rationalize the belief that H. Recognizing this 
fact, you form the reasonable belief that H at time t1, an instant later. Unfortunately, however, I 
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badly misjudge the probative force of the evidence E at time t1 and take up the unreasonable 
belief that not-H. 
 At time t1 then, prior to our learning about the other person, the situation is as follows. 
You hold the reasonable belief that H on the basis of your total evidence E while I hold the 
unreasonable belief that not-H on the basis of my total evidence E. The asymmetry in the 
epistemic statuses of our respective beliefs is due simply to the fact that E really does support H 
and does not support not-H. Suppose that we become aware of our disagreement at time t2. 
According to the view in question, our total evidence with respect to H has now changed. Let’s 
call our new total evidence at time t2 E*.  
Our new total evidence E* will include the following: 
E* = (i)  the original, first-order evidence E, 
        (ii)  the fact that you believe H on the basis of E, and 
       (iii)  the fact that I believe not-H on the basis of E.110 
The key fact here, says Kelly, is that there is no reason to think that the new evidence E* will 
invariably mandate an attitude of suspension of belief with respect to hypothesis H. Specifically, 
there is no reason to think your continuing to believe H is unreasonable on evidence E* given 
that it was reasonable when your total evidence consisted of just E. This is because the character 
of the new evidence E* will depend quite a bit on the character of the original evidence E. 
Indeed, Kelly thinks that if we give equal weight to (ii) and (iii), then H will be more probable 
than not-H on the new evidence E*, given that it was more probable on the original evidence E.  
To Kelly, our original evidence E does not simply vanish or become irrelevant once we 
learn what the other person believes on the basis of that evidence. Rather, it continues to play a 
role as an important subset of the new total evidence E*. On Feldman’s view, however, E gets 
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completely swamped by purely psychological facts about what you and I believe. Kelly asks, 
“But why should the normative significance of E completely vanish in this way?”111 In general, 
what one is and is not justified in believing on the basis of E* will depend a great deal on the 
character of the first-order evidence E. 
Thus, there is no reason to think that since you now have evidence E* that you will no 
longer be justified in believing H. Both you and I are epistemic peers, so it seems like (ii) and 
(iii) are to be given equal weight. If they are given equal weight, then they cancel each other out, 
in effect, and E* reduces to E (which supports your believing that H is true).112 Kelly concludes 
that even if one treats the higher-order evidence provided by the beliefs of one’s epistemic peers 
as evidence that bears on the disputed beliefs, it does not follow that agnosticism or suspension 
of judgment is the correct response to such disputes.  
Conclusion  
To Kelly, the higher-order evidence that a peer’s disagreement provides does not 
constitute a compelling basis for skepticism. As Kelly says, “The mere fact that others whom I 
acknowledge to be my equal with respect to intelligence, thoughtfulness, and acquaintance with 
the relevant data disagree with me about some issue does not undermine the rationality of my 
maintaining my own view.”113 Similarly, Sosa doesn’t think that peer disagreements entail that 
one of the parties must have an unjustified belief. Regarding his argument from private evidence, 
Sosa says that it opens up “possibilities for us to sustain our views reasonably even in the teeth of 
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outspoken opposition.”114 Are the objections that Sosa and Kelly level against Feldman fatal to 
Feldman’s conciliatory and skeptical view? The next chapter will be devoted to answering this 
question. 
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Chapter 3: A Reply to Feldman’s Critics 
Introduction 
In his article “Not Just a Truthometer,” David Enoch says that the discussion of peer 
disagreement is located in the wider context of epistemic imperfection. “We are here in the 
business of taking our own fallibility into account, and peer disagreement may very well be a 
relevant corrective,” says Enoch.115 Similarly, David Christensen says in his article 
“Disagreement, Question-Begging, and Epistemic Self-Criticism” that, in thinking about what 
the rational implications of a peer disagreement might be, we must keep the bottom line before 
our minds: “Rationality requires that I take seriously evidence of my own possible cognitive 
malfunction in arriving at my beliefs.”116 
The previous two chapters have illustrated that one aspect of thinking about our own 
possible malfunction in peer disagreements involves thinking about whether we’ve properly 
evaluated the different types of evidence in such disagreements. In particular, we have looked at 
the relation between rational belief and (a) one’s private and public evidence, and (b) one’s first-
order and higher-order evidence. In the last chapter, we saw that Ernest Sosa and Thomas Kelly 
resist Richard Feldman’s position on these points. They don’t think that disagreement between 
peers undermines the justification of the peers’ beliefs, necessitating suspension of judgment.  
In this chapter I will engage with Sosa and Kelly’s objections to Feldman. At a certain 
key point in the discussion of Sosa’s objection to come I will make use of an extended symmetry 
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principle. After explaining what this extended symmetry principle is in the next section, I will 
turn to Sosa and Kelly’s criticisms. 
The Extended Symmetry Principle 
In Chapter 1 we noted Feldman’s observation that a striking feature of cases of peer 
disagreement is the symmetry of the situation. As Feldman says, one is led to acknowledge the 
symmetry in those cases where another person, every bit as intelligent, serious, and careful as 
oneself, has reviewed the same information as oneself and has come to a contrary conclusion to 
one’s own. “In those cases, I think, the skeptical conclusion is the reasonable one: it is not the 
case that both points of view are reasonable, and it is not the case that one’s own point of view is 
somehow privileged. Rather, suspension of judgment is called for.”117 
 Even if it is true that the arguments in fact favor one party’s side in the debate, the 
outcome of the discussion includes the peers’ realization that for each thing one of them can say 
in support of his view, the other can say something analogous in support of the other view. To 
stick to one’s guns in such a disagreement would be arbitrary; it would be to fail to treat like 
cases alike, which Feldman says is “a violation of what I take to be a clear condition for rational 
belief.”118 
In his essay “A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Weight View,” Stewart Cohen points out a 
parallel between the symmetry principle Feldman has in mind, and a familiar principle in ethics. 
The principle in ethics says that the mere fact that an action is mine rather than someone else’s 
cannot be relevant to the moral status of the action. Similarly, the “mere fact that . . . [an opinion] 
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is my opinion rather than my peer’s cannot be relevant to the rational status of that opinion.”119 
When two epistemic peers with the same evidence disagree, neither seems to have any basis for 
favoring his own belief over his peer’s. Given the relevant symmetries, one should give equal 
weight to a peer’s attitude as to one’s own. The disputing peers’ mutual knowledge of the 
symmetry, then, is a prima facie defeater for preferring one’s own view. 
Thus, Feldman’s symmetry principle applies in cases where the two disagreeing peers 
share the same evidence, since there is a symmetry of possessed evidence. But I think this 
principle can be extended to disagreements where evidential disparity (i.e., private evidence) is 
present.120 Here is how symmetry applies in these cases. Suppose that the evidence involved in 
some peer disagreement is the set of shared public evidence plus private reason A and private 
reason B. Both peers know about the public evidence, and each makes an argument based on it to 
support their conflicting positions. But in addition to this, the first peer has private reason A that 
he takes to justify his disputed belief. Since his peer lacks private reason A, the first peer feels 
confident that he is rational in holding to his disputed belief, precisely because he has this private 
evidence that his peer lacks. The second peer sees the disagreement similarly. He has private 
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reason B that the first peer lacks, so he thinks he’s justified in continuing to hold his belief 
confidently. 
 Both disagreeing peers think that their private reasons have tipped the evidential scale in 
their respective favors, since each has a relevant bit of evidence his peer lacks. In this case, there 
isn’t symmetry of possessed evidence; the peers don’t share the exact same evidence. But I think 
there is symmetry of unpossessed evidence. Let’s say that the second peer’s lack of access to 
private reason A is an evidential deficiency, since from the first peer’s point of view not having 
access to private reason A means one is missing a key reason that justifies the first peer’s belief. 
But notice that the second peer can say the exact same thing about the first peer. The second peer 
can reason as follows: “I have private reason B, which my peer lacks, and I take it that private 
reason B is weightier than my peer’s dissent, so I’ll continue confidently holding my disputed 
belief.”  
From the second peer’s perspective, his peer is evidentially deficient because he lacks 
access to private reason B. And so both peers view each other as evidentially deficient in this 
particular case because each lacks the other’s private reason. Because of this, both think they are 
justified in holding fast in their positions. 
However, I don’t think that holding fast is necessarily the right move in this situation. It 
seems that what these two peers should be thinking is this: “My peer has an important bit of 
evidence, a private reason, which I lack. If I did have access to it, it might significantly challenge 
my position; so, given my evidential deficiency in this regard, I’m not justified in holding my 
original belief as confidently as I did. I need to revise or suspend judgment due to the impact of 
this unpossessed evidence.”121 
                                                 
121 In my evaluation of Sosa’s objection I’ll lay out why I think knowledge of unpossessed evidence serves 
as an undermining defeater of one’s belief.  
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Thus, since both peers are evidentially deficient in the sense of not possessing each 
other’s private reasons, both should understand that awareness of the other’s private evidence is 
a reason to lower their confidence in thinking that they are the ones who have arrived at the right 
belief. Put differently, knowledge of the mere existence of a peer’s private evidence serves as a 
prima facie defeater for the justification of one’s own belief. The extended symmetry principle 
shows that each peer is equally disadvantaged in this case, and so it would be arbitrary for one 
peer to prefer his own view just because it is his.  
The extended symmetry principle guides us in thinking about cases of peer disagreement, 
cases in which there is a symmetry of possessed evidence and a symmetry of unpossessed 
evidence. The purpose of the extended symmetry principle is to help us spot when one party to a 
disagreement arbitrarily prefers his own view. I take it as intuitively clear that when two persons 
are in an epistemic situation that displays symmetry, they rationally ought to treat like cases 
alike, not favoring their own beliefs simply because they are their own. As I will argue when 
responding to Sosa, I think that Sosa’s objection from private evidence violates this principle.  
 Responding to Sosa 
 Sosa’s concern with Feldman’s argument for suspending judgment in peer disagreements 
was that Feldman failed to account for the import of private evidence. Feldman argued that two 
peers cannot have a reasonable disagreement with each other once they have disclosed their 
reasons, since, if they fully disclose their reasons, then neither peer has any evidence that the 
other lacks. Neither peer would have a rational basis for preferring his own view, as Feldman’s 
symmetry principle is meant to show. But Sosa argues that one important type of evidence 
cannot be disclosed. Private reasons are one type of evidence that justifies – to whatever degree – 
each peer’s disputed belief, but these private reasons are usually inscrutable or hard to uncover, 
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not open to reflection. So, part of the justificatory basis for each peer’s belief cannot be 
disclosed. This means that full disclosure rarely takes place in peer disagreements. If there is no 
full disclosure, then no rational obligation to suspend judgment follows. Thus, Sosa thinks that 
by noting the full significance of private evidence, we see that two peers needn’t suspend 
judgment in a disagreement – both can be justified in their controversial beliefs. 
 My response to Sosa is two-pronged. First, I challenge the idea that we should even 
consider a reason that is inscrutable or that cannot be uncovered as ‘evidence’. Second, I argue 
that even if we do count private evidence as evidence, this isn’t sufficient to make room for 
reasonable peer disagreements. It seems that the extended symmetry principle will apply in cases 
of disagreement involving private evidence. If this is so, then each peer’s knowledge that he 
lacks a relevant piece of (private) evidence will serve as a prima facie defeater for his disputed 
belief. If each peer knows about the existence of the other’s private reason, then neither will have 
a rational basis for preferring his own view. 
 What Counts as ‘Evidence’? 
 Evidentialism says that whether one is justified in believing p depends on one’s evidence 
regarding p, and that one’s evidence consists of one’s mental states.122 Evidentialism, then, is an 
internalist theory of justification. Robert Audi provides this definition of internalism: 
To have (internal) access to something is either to have it in consciousness or to be able, 
through self-consciousness or at least by reflection, whether introspective or directed 
“outward” toward an abstract subject matter, to become aware of it, in the (phenomenal) 
sense that it is in one’s consciousness. Call the view that justification is grounded in 
accessible elements internalism about justification.123  
 
                                                 
122 Matthias Steup, “Epistemology,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
2014: URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/epistemology/>.    
 
123 Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 3rd ed. (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 2011), 273.   
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Thus, evidentialism, as a particular type of internalism, holds that epistemic justification is 
entirely a matter of internal evidential factors.124 These internal evidential factors will be present 
to the mind, or accessible, in the form of mental states. 
What kinds of mental states count as evidence, exactly? In his essay “Having Evidence” 
Feldman deals with this question. As Feldman explains, people often consciously entertain 
beliefs that were initially formed on the basis of evidence that they do not, and perhaps cannot, 
recall. It isn’t clear whether such evidence counts as part of the evidence they have. Maybe 
whether it counts depends upon if, or how easily, it can be recalled.125 Becoming clear on what 
counts as evidence possessed seems essential to epistemic evaluations of cases in which stored 
information that does not come to mind counts against something that is supported by the 
evidence one does consider, that is present to one’s mind.  
Feldman argues that we should think of what it means to have something as evidence (as 
available evidence) as follows: 
(1) S has p available as evidence at t if and only if S is currently thinking of p.126   
This view limits available evidence to what one is thinking of at a certain time. To flesh out (1), 
Feldman introduces some terminology. Feldman says that the total possible evidence a person 
has at a time includes all and only the information the person has ‘stored in his mind’ at the time. 
This is a very broad notion, including everything that one has actively believed and could recall 
                                                 
124 Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, “Internalism Defended,” in Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology, 
eds. Earl Conee and Richard Feldman (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004), 53.  
 
125 Feldman, “Having Evidence,” in Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology, eds. Earl Conee and Richard 
Feldman (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004), 220.  
 
126 Ibid., 232.  
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with some prompting. It includes past beliefs that were adopted for no good reason, and it 
includes things that could be recalled only with great difficulty.127 
 The total evidence one has at a time is some part of the total possible evidence one has at 
that time. Something that is part of one's total possible evidence may fail to be part of one's total 
(actual) evidence for one of two reasons. It may fail to meet some psychological accessibility 
condition or it may fail to meet some epistemic acceptability condition. Feldman says that any 
part of one's total possible evidence that satisfies this psychological condition is part of the 
evidence one has available. Evidence that satisfies the epistemic condition will be said to be 
acceptable.128 So, that portion of one's total possible evidence that is both available and 
acceptable is the total evidence one has.129 Our concern is primarily with the conditions under 
which evidence is available, which is what (1) is getting at. 
 (1) restricts a person’s evidence to what one is currently thinking of at a time. 
Accordingly, (1) states that one’s total evidence – namely, that portion of one’s total possible 
evidence that is both psychologically available and epistemically acceptable – is constituted 
solely by what a person is thinking of at some specific time. 
 I think there are two reasons to prefer Feldman’s notion, communicated in (1), of what it 
means to have evidence: first, a more inclusive and liberal view of what it means to have 
something as available evidence leads to some implausible results, and second, Feldman’s 
restrictive view seems to be more in accord with the internalist aspect of evidentialism than more 
                                                 
127 Ibid., 226. 
 
128 Feldman explains that, on this view, epistemic acceptability determines not what counts as evidence 
possessed but rather what is made rational or justified by the evidence possessed.  
 
129 Feldman, “Having Evidence,” 226-227.  
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inclusive views of what counts as available evidence. Consider the first reason. The following is 
an inclusive conception of what it means to have evidence as available: 
 (2) S has p available as evidence at t iff p is included in S's total possible evidence at t.130   
According to this view, everything one actively believes at a time and every belief that is 
retrievable from one's memory would be a part of one's available evidence at that time. It seems 
that this view of evidence is lacking because it is over-inclusive, though. Consider an example 
provided by Feldman for why this view is inadequate: 
Easily devised examples suggest that . . . [(2)] is far too inclusive. Some such examples 
concern the evidential status of childhood memories that could only be recalled with 
extensive and highly directed prompting. Suppose, for example, that the house I lived in 
as a young child was painted yellow, but on my own I cannot remember the house and 
have no testimonial evidence concerning its color. If I were asked its color, I would 
report honestly that I couldn't remember. If we add to the story the fact that some 
complex set of prompts will trigger in me a clear memory of the house, and reveal its 
color, then . . . [(2)] has the highly counter-intuitive result that I now, prior to the prompt, 
have as evidence this memory of the house. Coupled with standard theories of 
justification . . . [(2)] yields the implausible result that I am now justified (or at least 
highly rational) in believing that the house was yellow. In this situation it would be most 
unfair to claim that I am epistemically irresponsible or blameworthy for failing to make 
proper use of my evidence or for failing to believe that my house was yellow. Indeed, it 
seems clear that the epistemically proper thing for me to do is to suspend judgment on 
most propositions concerning its color.131 
 
As Feldman notes in his illustration above, the conception of what it means to have evidence as 
available expressed in (2) entails that one can have evidence stored in one’s memory that can 
supposedly justify one’s beliefs even if the individual in question cannot remember what that 
evidence is on her own. This notion seems implausible, since it implies that one is epistemically 
blameworthy if one fails to make use of this evidence. But how can one be held responsible for 
failing to make use of evidence that, by its very nature, cannot be accessed by the individual on 
                                                 
130 Ibid., 228.  
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her own? Because of this, it seems reasonable to restrict what counts as available evidence to 
what the individual can access on her own in the moment of her deliberation, which is the view 
given by Feldman in (1) above. 
 The second reason to prefer Feldman’s restricted view offered in (1) is that it is a natural 
extension of the internalist aspect of evidentialism, and it appropriately satisfies the internalist 
concerns regarding justification. At the beginning of this section we noted that internalism holds 
that justification is grounded in accessible mental elements. In his essay “Recent Work on the 
Internalism–Externalism Controversy,” Laurence BonJour highlights two corollaries of thinking 
of internalism as the view that justification is grounded in accessible elements. One is that only a 
view according to which all of the elements required to yield a cogent reason for the belief in 
question are appropriately accessible can satisfy the fundamental internalist intuition. It is only if 
this is so that the person genuinely has a reason – as opposed to merely part of a reason – for the 
belief, one that could seem reflectively to justify the belief and that is available for critical 
assessment. A view that allows some element that is essential to the cogency of a justificatory 
reason to be outside of the person’s cognitive perspective doesn’t satisfy internalist concerns. 
The other corollary is that the ‘accessibility’ of the justificatory elements must be 
understood in a very strong way, in terms of reflective accessibility. That I have access, in a 
sense, to a reference work or to a perceptible situation that could yield a reason does not 
necessarily make those reasons internally accessible in the right way, since until I do whatever is 
required to avail myself of them I do not actually have the reason in question. The fact that a 
basis for a reason is lurking somehow in my perceptual experience or system of beliefs or other 
mental contents in an entirely unnoticed way also does not seem to give me an appropriately 
internalist reason for the corresponding belief. Until I do whatever is needed to isolate the 
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ingredients of such a reason and put them together in an appropriate way, I again do not actually 
have the reason in question, and I am also not in a position to evaluate it critically.132  
Thus, what mainly matters on internalism is not the metaphysical status of a justificatory 
element or factor, but instead its availability to the person as a reason for accepting a particular 
belief, a reason that one is thereby in a position to critically evaluate. This is to say that the 
relevant sort of internality is being accessible to a person’s first-person cognitive perspective. 
Feldman’s conception of evidential availability given in (1) seems to satisfy these internalist 
intuitions well, since it limits one’s evidence to what one is currently thinking. One very well 
may have further evidence that is stored in one’s mind that would be relevant to the belief being 
deliberated. But one must be able to avail one’s self of it – be able to access it for consideration 
in the moment of deliberation – for it to count as actual evidence or an actual reason (as opposed 
to a merely potential one).  
This means that, on the internalist–evidentialist view outlined in this section, we 
shouldn’t count inaccessible memories or unconscious mental states as evidence. We also 
shouldn’t count as evidence some property of a person’s mental state – e.g., something like the 
coherence of his entire system of beliefs – that is too complex and multi-faceted for one to ever 
be capable of reflectively apprehending that it obtains. 
 How does Sosa’s notion of private evidence fare given these considerations about what 
counts as evidence? Not well, it seems. Sosa speaks of private evidence as evidence that cannot 
                                                 
132 BonJour, “Recent Work on the Internalism–Externalism Controversy,” in A Companion to 
Epistemology, eds. Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), §1. 
(Note: I accessed this work as an eBook, and the text doesn’t have page numbers. So, I cite my reference to it via 
section number, as indicated above.) Bonjour clarifies that he does not want to insist that all of this must be done in 
a fully overt, explicit way, though from a strictly epistemological standpoint this is obviously optimum. But some 
sort of tacit or implicit awareness of what is involved seems required if one is to have an actual reason rather than a 
merely potential one.  
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be cited or expounded to an opponent or to oneself; it is evidence that is inscrutable, that cannot 
be explicated fully due to its complexity and extensiveness, that cannot be displayed for 
reflection on how well it supports the content of our belief. When the private reasons that ground 
some belief are thus complex, and, in some cases, temporally extended with the aid of memory, 
our full grounding for that belief lies beyond our present view. To Sosa, if we can’t even spot or 
lay out our operative evidence, so much of which lies in the past and is no longer operative 
except indirectly through retained beliefs, then we cannot disclose it so as to share it. Despite all 
this inaccessibility, Sosa says that private reasons “seem conclusive, then, even if . . . [one] 
cannot lay them out, one by one, perhaps even to himself in private.”133 
 Given our discussion in the preceding paragraphs, it seems reasonable to say that what 
Sosa calls private evidence isn’t really evidence. If we have good reason to think that we should 
restrict a person’s evidence to what one is currently thinking – where all of the elements required 
to yield a cogent reason for the belief in question are appropriately accessible for reflection – 
then I think we have good reason to conclude that Sosa’s private reasons don’t count as 
evidence.  
 If private evidence doesn’t count as evidence, then Sosa’s objection to Feldman on the 
basis of private evidence loses its force. Sosa argued that the full disclosure of evidence in peer 
disagreements rarely happens, since private evidence is an important type evidence in 
disagreements that influences the justification of the peers’ disputed beliefs but that cannot be 
disclosed. If private evidence isn’t really evidence, though, then Sosa’s basis for arguing that the 
full disclosure condition doesn’t get satisfied in peer disagreements dissolves. Thus, Feldman’s 
argument for suspension of judgment in peer disagreements, on the condition that the peers have 
                                                 
133 Sosa, “The Epistemology of Disagreement,” in Social Epistemology, eds. Adrian Haddock, Alan Miller, 
and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 288.  
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fully disclosed their reasons and yet remain at odds with each other, doesn’t seem to be 
threatened by considerations of private evidence.   
 The Extended Symmetry Principle and Private Evidence 
 In the last section we concluded that it’s plausible to say that private evidence doesn’t 
count as evidence. But even if we do count private evidence as evidence, I don’t think it clearly 
follows that two epistemic peers can have a reasonable disagreement, where both of their 
conflicting beliefs are justified (as Sosa thinks). It seems that the extended symmetry principle 
applies in disagreements involving private evidence, since disagreements involving private 
evidence appear to display symmetry of unpossessed evidence.  
  How does symmetry of unpossessed evidence influence the justificatory status of one’s 
belief? Consider what the extended symmetry principle says: when two epistemic peers disagree, 
if anything one of the disputants can say in favor of his view – i.e., citing public reasons, or 
private reasons that he has but that his peer lacks – can also be said by the other disputant in 
favor of his view, then neither disputant has a justifying reason to prefer his own view over that 
of his peer’s view. The idea is that awareness of symmetry removes any basis for preferring 
one’s own view. My argument, then, is that if there is symmetry of unpossessed evidence in peer 
disagreements, awareness of this symmetry will be a defeater for the justification for one’s 
belief. 
 Earlier in this chapter when we introduced the extended symmetry principle I explained 
how there appears to be symmetry of unpossessed evidence in peer disagreements involving 
private evidence. If we suppose that two peers disagree about some issue, the first peer might 
possess private reason A (which the second peer lacks), and the second peer might possess 
private reason B (which the first peer lacks). Both possess private reasons, but neither peer 
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knows what the other’s private reason is. Presumably, all that each peer knows about the other’s 
private reason is that it exists. This is how Sosa described private evidence when discussing 
Moore’s disagreement with the skeptic. Sosa said that Moore knew that he had conclusive 
private reasons justifying his belief that he was awake and not dreaming, despite the fact that 
Moore couldn’t expound those reasons to the skeptic or to himself. Moore could report to the 
skeptic that he had these reasons, but he couldn’t tell the skeptic much more than that. 
 So, in a peer disagreement involving private evidence each peer will recognize that he 
has an item of evidence that his peer doesn’t possess, and vice versa. This is where symmetry 
between the two peers’ situations shows itself. Both peers will realize that they don’t possess an 
important item of evidence relevant to their disagreement, namely, each other’s private reasons. 
There is thus symmetry of unpossessed evidence in disagreements involving private evidence. 
 Supposing there is this symmetry of unpossessed evidence, what should the awareness of 
it lead each peer to think about his disputed belief? I think that an awareness of unpossessed 
evidence will tend to undermine the justification for one’s belief. In his article “The Significance 
of Unpossessed Evidence,” Nathan Ballantyne argues that recognizing that our evidence is 
partial challenges our justification for believing as we do. Consider an example offered by 
Ballantyne to illustrate this point: 
LIBRARY: You are wandering among rows of bookshelves at the library. These books 
concern matters about which you hold views. But you’ve read only a few of them. Let’s 
imagine you think that free will and determinism are compatible, having studied a dozen 
journal articles and a couple of books years ago in graduate school. Scanning the shelves 
here, you appreciate that there are several dozen titles relevant to the question of whether 
compatibilism about free will is true. Some books contain arguments against your view. 
You hadn’t considered this mass of work until now and you haven’t yet looked at it.134 
 
                                                 
134 Nathan Ballantyne, “The Significance of Unpossessed Evidence” (The Philosophical Quarterly 65, no. 
260, 2015), 315. 
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Ballantyne says that this example leaves us feeling that rational belief in compatibilism is 
threatened by learning about unpossessed evidence. This introduces us to the problem of 
unpossessed evidence, which is constituted by the question of whether rational belief is 
sometimes incompatible with recognizing that we have only part of the relevant evidence.  
 To draw out the problem that unpossessed evidence poses for rational belief, consider 
how a belief could be defeated by recognizing that our evidence is partial. When we learn that 
there is evidence we don’t have, we sometimes learn that part of that unpossessed evidence 
would defeat a particular belief of ours. But evidence that there is an unpossessed defeater for a 
belief is a prima facie defeater for that belief. 
 To further draw out this idea, suppose that we believe proposition p. There are different 
ways our evidence may rationally challenge our belief, simply by telling us about the 
unpossessed evidence. First, our evidence may indicate that the evidence we don’t have supports 
not-p. In other words, it is evidence of a rebutting defeater for p, or a reason to disbelieve p. 
Second, our evidence may indicate that the unpossessed evidence tells against the rationality of 
believing p. Thus, it is evidence of an undermining defeater for p, removing our justification for 
believing p.135   
 So if we suppose our belief in p is rational but we then gain evidence indicating that there 
is unpossessed evidence that contains either a rebutting or undermining defeater for belief in p 
relative to that unpossessed evidence, then it seems we would need to revise our belief regarding 
how justified we are in believing p. For example, imagine we are in the library and notice some 
books having to do with free will. We realize that some of these works contain arguments against 
compatibilism. It is plausible to think that the set of evidence comprised by the several books 
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that defend incompatibilism contains defeaters of belief in compatibilism. Whoever has that set 
has a defeater for believing compatibilism to be the case. Given these things, we might reason as 
follows:  
M1: Evidence of the existence of a defeater for believing p relative to some body of 
evidence is a (prima facie) defeater for believing p relative to any body of evidence. 
 
M2: I have evidence of the existence of a defeater for believing proposition p relative to 
some body of unpossessed evidence. 
 
M3: I have no defeater for that (prima facie) defeater for believing p. 
 
M4: Therefore, I have an undefeated defeater for believing p.136 
 
Ballantyne calls this the ‘Meta-Defeater Argument’. M1 is related to an epistemic principle 
captured by Feldman’s slogan “evidence of evidence is evidence.”137 M1 roughly says that 
evidence of a defeater for believing p is a prima facie defeater for believing p.  
 M2 is given by the details of the library example. In that situation, we can imagine 
learning about an unpossessed defeater. What is important is that we may accept M2 without 
having the unpossessed defeater in hand. Imagine that we read the dust jacket blurbs of the books 
in the library on free will, which we haven’t yet read, and we learn that incompatibilism is 
defended therein. In that case, we would have reason to think that there is a defeater for 
compatibilism relative to some unpossessed evidence, but we would not have that defeater 
itself.138 
 How about M3? In the library example, it doesn’t seem that we have a defeater for the 
defeater in that example. This is because we lack reason to think that those books we haven’t 
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read are unreliable. We also lack reason to think that our original evidence for our belief in 
compatibilism is representative of the total evidence, in the sense that we would be unlikely to 
gain a new defeater if we were to read those books. In other words, since we have no reason to 
think that the books on free will that we haven’t read are unreliable, and because we have no 
reason to think that our original evidence for our belief is representative of the total evidence, we 
have no reason to think that our original evidence is better than the unpossessed evidence.139 
 Think of it like this. We are not sure if the subset of the total evidence that we have 
contains as much accurate, non-misleading evidence as other subsets. Following our evidence 
may or may not be as good of a guide to the truth as following other subsets of evidence. 
Suppose we were to put our evidence up against other subsets of the total evidence. Which 
would prove to be best? Unfortunately, we usually cannot tell whether our evidence is more 
likely to indicate what’s true than the subsets containing evidence that we don’t have, so we 
shouldn’t presume our evidence is superior. It is for these reasons that, in a case like LIBRARY, 
we lack reason to believe that our original evidence is better than the unpossessed evidence. 
Thus, in the library example, we won’t have a defeater-defeater but will have reason to affirm 
M3.140 
 Thus, the Meta-defeater Argument shows that there is a defeater for our belief in the 
library example in particular, and it also seems to indicate that, in general, we get a prima facie 
defeater for our belief when we recognize that there is relevant evidence that we don’t possess. 
In cases of peer disagreement, where there is symmetry of unpossessed evidence, both peers 
should recognize that knowledge of the existence of each other’s private reasons is evidence of 
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the existence of a defeater for each of their beliefs. And evidence of the mere existence of a 
defeater, even if the two peers don’t have that defeater itself, is a prima facie defeater for their 
beliefs.141  
 The implication of this discussion of the symmetry of unpossessed evidence for Sosa’s 
notion of private evidence is this: while Sosa thinks that each peer’s having private evidence 
justifies them in sticking to their original opinions in a disagreement, it seems that knowledge of 
the existence of each other’s private evidence undermines the justification of the peers’ original 
opinions. If private evidence plays a key role in peer disagreements, then both peers should 
become aware that there exists a prima facie defeater for their original opinions that they don’t 
have access to. The peer who has private reason A won’t be able to tell if that bit of evidence is 
more likely to indicate what’s true than his peer’s private reason B. The same will apply for the 
peer who has private reason B. This realization should lead both peers to become less confident 
in their beliefs, perhaps even to suspend judgment on them entirely until more information 
becomes available.142  
 Consequently, even if we grant that private evidence should count as evidence, it doesn’t 
follow that Sosa’s argument from private evidence overturns Feldman’s claim that suspension of 
                                                 
141 Of course, either of the two peers may have a defeater-defeater for the prima facie defeater here. In the 
case of a peer disagreement, a defeater-defeater would probably come in the form of some reason to think that one’s 
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142 Earl Conee comes to a similar conclusion in his article “Peerage” (Episteme 6, no. 3, 2009), 316. Conee 
says that if opposing peers purport to have their own supporting incommunicable insight, then we would need some 
distinguishing basis to regard ours as the genuine article. Otherwise, our reasons regarding private insights would 
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about his having an apparent insight on his own side. So if an epistemic peer does report an incommunicable insight 
in support of denying the proposition we believe, then we know of two apparent insights that point in opposite 
directions, theirs and ours. Theirs rationally balances oﬀ ours. So our apparent insight does not give us an 
undefeated balance of reasons in favor of our own view.  
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judgment needs to happen in peer disagreements. Rather, when we see that disagreements 
involving private evidence display symmetry of unpossessed evidence, it seems that each peer’s 
knowledge of the existence of the other’s private evidence will be a prima facie defeater for their 
original beliefs. Given the relevant symmetries, neither peer will any longer have a rational basis 
for preferring his own view. 
 Responding to Kelly 
 Kelly criticized conciliatory views like Feldman’s in two respects. Feldman claims that 
an epistemic peer’s disagreement is higher-order evidence that impacts the justification of one’s 
belief. But Kelly argues that we shouldn’t treat a peer’s belief as evidence concerning the 
disputed belief in question because (i) the person who formed the belief wouldn’t count her own 
belief as additional support for her view, and (ii) to count that person’s belief would be a kind of 
double-counting of the original, first-order evidence.  
 Kelly’s second criticism is that, even if we assume that a peer’s belief does count as 
evidence that impacts the justification of one’s belief, it wouldn’t follow that this evidence would 
lead one to suspend judgment. Kelly doesn’t think that in a peer disagreement one’s first-order 
evidence gets swamped by higher-order considerations. Rather, if one was justified in her belief 
based on a correct assessment of the first-order evidence before learning about her peer’s 
disagreement, then it is likely that she will still be justified in her original belief even after 
learning about the disagreement. 
 I think that Kelly’s reasons are wrongheaded in the end. Regarding Kelly’s first criticism, 
I argue that Kelly’s argument rests on an implicit false assumption. Kelly’s false assumption is 
that, if one’s own belief can be defeated by a peer’s opposing belief at all, then we have to think 
of our peer’s opposing belief as being a certain kind of defeater: a rebutting defeater. Kelly then 
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goes to certain lengths to argue that a peer’s opposing belief doesn’t qualify as a rebutting 
defeater, and so one’s own belief is not threatened by a peer’s opposing belief. Coupled with this 
this false assumption is, I think, a mistaken view of higher-order evidence on Kelly’s part. So, I 
will address both Kelly’s false assumption and his view of higher-order evidence.143  
 Regarding Kelly’s second criticism, it seems that in laying out his argument he assumes a 
non-internalist view of justification. Kelly seems to imply that external or metaphysical 
justification is what matters in peer disagreements. Since Kelly employs an externalist notion of 
justification, this leads him to argue that there is an asymmetry present in peer disagreements. 
This asymmetry is present when one peer has actually formed the right belief – i.e., is externally 
justified – while the other peer has misjudged the evidence and formed an unreasonable belief. 
Kelly thinks this asymmetry is sufficient to justify one in sticking confidently to her belief in a 
peer disagreement. While I agree that there is a metaphysical asymmetry in a case like this, the 
peers don’t have internal or mental access to this metaphysical fact, so they can’t reason based 
on it. Thus, they wouldn’t be justified in sticking to their guns.   
 Peer Beliefs as Defeaters  
Suppose that two epistemic peers share the same total evidence E with respect to some 
proposition p. Then consider these three claims: 
(C1): E is good evidence that p is true. 
(C2): S believes p on the basis of E. 
(C3): p is true. 
 
If one discovers that his peer believes p on the basis of E, he should treat that discovery as 
higher-order evidence supporting (C1). Kelly agrees with this, since he thinks a piece of higher-
                                                 
143 Kelly himself has slightly revised his original view of higher-order evidence since he gave this objection 
in 2005. I touch on this briefly in the following discussion. 
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order evidence provides one with evidence about what one’s evidence supports.144 But if one 
discovers that his peer believes p on the basis of E, should he also treat that discovery as 
confirming evidence for p itself? In other words, is (C2) evidence for (C3)? 
Kelly says no. He argues that we shouldn’t treat a peer’s belief as evidence regarding p 
itself because (i) the person who formed the belief wouldn’t count his own belief that p as 
additional support for p, and (ii) to count that person’s belief would be a kind of double-counting 
of the original, first-order evidence. If (C2) is not evidence for (C3), then discovering that one’s 
peer believes p on the basis of E does not provide one with evidence regarding p itself. If this is 
right, then it seems like Feldman’s view will be false, since discovering that one’s peer holds an 
opposing belief fails to provide one with evidence pertaining to the disputed proposition itself.145 
Notice what Kelly argues here. He claims that if a view like Feldman’s is to have any 
force, then it must be committed to saying that (C2) is evidence for (C3). To Kelly, this is the 
only way the rationality of one’s own belief can be threatened by a peer’s opposing belief. Kelly 
then argues that we have good reason to think (C2) is not evidence for (C3). With this in mind, 
now consider the following three claims: 
(C1*): E is good evidence that p is not true. 
(C2*): S believes not-p on the basis of E. 
(C3*): p is false. 
 
Again, Kelly argues that (C2*) is higher-order evidence for (C1*). Finding out that one’s peer 
believes not-p on the basis of E is a reason for thinking (C1*) is true. But Kelly argues that 
finding out that one’s peer believes not-p on the basis of E does not give one a reason to think p 
                                                 
144 Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 1, 
eds. Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 186.   
 
145 Jonathan Matheson, “Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence” (Episteme 6, no. 
3, 2009), 272.   
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is false. (C2*) is not evidence for (C3*), for Kelly’s two reasons given in the above paragraph. 
Thus, (C2*) says nothing about whether p is a justified or rational belief.  
Again, Kelly argues that if this is right, then Feldman’s view will be wrong, since what 
motivates a view like Feldman’s is the idea that becoming aware of a peer disagreement affects 
the degree of confidence one ought to have toward p. But if (C2*) isn’t evidence for (C3*) – if 
(C2*) is only evidence for (C1*), as Kelly thinks – then discovering a peer’s disagreement does 
not provide one with evidence regarding p itself. If this is the right way to think about higher-
order evidence, then discovering a peer’s disagreement fails to provide one with evidence 
pertaining to the disputed belief.146 
 Thus, Kelly’s main point is this: the only way for our belief that p to be defeated by a 
peer’s opposing belief that not-p is if our peer’s opposing belief is falsifying evidence for p. But, 
Kelly continues, we shouldn’t take our peer’s opposing belief as falsifying evidence. Therefore, 
our peer’s opposing belief isn’t a defeater for own belief. Now we can clearly state the implicit 
assumption that Kelly’s argument rests on: 
(Assumption) S1’s belief that p can only be defeated by S2’s belief that not-p if we treat 
S2’s belief that not-p as falsifying evidence for p itself. 
 
So, it seems Kelly assumes that the only way for one’s belief that p to be defeated is if we treat 
his peer’s belief that not-p as evidence indicating that p is false. This is the same as saying that if 
a peer’s opposing belief is to count as a defeater, then it must come in the form of a rebutting 
defeater. Rebutting defeaters are simply counter-evidence. A rebutting defeater for believing p is 
a reason to disbelieve p to one degree or another. In contrast to rebutting defeaters, undercutting 
(or undermining) defeaters are not evidence that proposition p is false. An undermining defeater 
is a reason that attacks the connection between your belief in p and its grounds. Importantly, such 
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a defeater is consistent with p’s being true, but it removes or neutralizes the grounds so that 
believing p to one degree or another becomes irrational.147 
 Why would Kelly restrict the manner in which one’s belief that p can be defeated by a 
peer’s opposing belief to rebutting defeaters only? I’m not sure exactly. But this is what he does 
in his 2005 essay “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” from which the objection that 
we are currently dealing with comes. In his analysis there he argues for why we shouldn’t think 
of a peer’s opposing belief as ‘evidence for or against p’ and that is where he ends the matter.148 
But this says nothing about whether a peer’s opposing belief might be an undercutting defeater. 
An undercutting defeater can defeat one’s justification for believing p, and yet such a defeater 
wouldn’t come in the form of evidence for or against p.  
 With this assumption now exposed, consider again these three claims, with one additional 
claim: 
(C1*): E is good evidence that p is not true. 
(C2*): S believes not-p on the basis of E. 
(C3*): p is false.  
(C4*): One is not justified in believing p on the basis of E. 
 
(C2*) is higher-order evidence supporting (C1*). Kelly accepts this, since he thinks higher-order 
evidence is evidence about what one’s first-order evidence E supports. But notice, if we have a 
reason to think that E is not good evidence that p is true, then it seems we will also have a prima 
facie reason to think that one is not justified in believing p on the basis of E. In other words, I 
think that if (C2*) is evidence for (C1*), then (C1*) will be evidence for (C4*) to some degree. 
If this is right, then the fact that one’s peer believes not-p on the basis of E is a prima facie 
defeater for one’s own belief that p on the basis of E. A peer’s opposing belief, then, would 
                                                 
147 Ballantyne, “The Significance of Unpossessed Evidence,” 318-319.  
 
148 Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” 185-190.  
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undermine the justification of one’s own belief, without saying anything about whether the belief 
is true or false. 
 Thus, if Kelly accepts that (C2*) is evidence for (C1*), then I think he should also accept 
that (C1*) is at least some reason to accept (C4*). In his 2005 essay “The Epistemic Significance 
of Disagreement” Kelly doesn’t make this move because he doesn’t think that higher-order 
evidence about what one’s first-order evidence supports is typically relevant to what it is 
reasonable to believe on the basis of that evidence. I think this claim is misguided. If we think 
that higher-order evidence is evidence about what one’s first-order evidence supports, then that 
higher-order evidence will have implications, at the very least indirectly, but importantly 
nonetheless, for the reasonableness of beliefs based on that first-order evidence. 
 I won’t argue for this view of higher-order evidence here, since Kelly himself has revised 
his view of higher-order evidence and now thinks that the higher-order evidence provided by a 
peer’s disagreement is always epistemically significant and has an impact on the justification of 
the disputed belief.149 Kelly says in his 2010 essay “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order 
                                                 
149 While I won’t argue in the text above for the view that higher-order evidence impacts the justification of 
beliefs based on one’s first-order evidence, which Kelly now accepts, I will offer an example here for why I think 
this view of higher-order evidence is right. Suppose Smith is an anesthesiologist, trying to determine which dosage 
of pain medication is best for his patient: A or B. To ﬁgure this out, Smith assesses some fairly complex medical 
evidence. When evaluated correctly, this kind of evidence determines which dose is right for the patient. After 
thinking hard about the evidence, Smith becomes highly conﬁdent that dose B is right. In fact, Smith has reasoned 
correctly; his evidence strongly supports that B is the correct dose.  
Then Jones, the chef at the hospital’s cafeteria, rushes in. ‘‘Don’t administer that drug just yet,’’ he says 
guiltily. ‘‘You’re not in a position to properly assess that medical evidence. I slipped some reason-distorting 
mushrooms into your lunch earlier as a prank. These mushrooms make you much less reliable at determining which 
dose the evidence supports: in the circumstances you presently face – evaluating this type of medical evidence, 
under the inﬂuence of my mushrooms – doctors like you only tend to prescribe the right dose 60 % of the time!’’ In 
fact, Jones is mistaken: the mushrooms he used were just regular dried mushrooms, and Smith’s reasoning is not 
impaired in the least. But neither Jones nor Smith knows (nor has reason to suspect) this. 
Jones’ telling Smith about the reason-distorting mushrooms is higher-order evidence for Smith. Smith 
originally concluded on the basis of his first-order evidence that dose B was right for the patient. But now his 
justification for believing that dose B is right has been threatened by Jones’ report. If Kelly’s original view of 
higher-order evidence is right, then it would be rational for Smith to respond like this: “Sure, Jones, you’ve drugged 
me; but I must be immune to the drug’s effects. After all, I’m highly confident that dose B is right, and my evidence 
supports it!” A response like this doesn’t seem rational. So it seems we have reason to think that higher-order 
evidence does have a bearing on what it is reasonable for one to believe on the basis of his first-order evidence. This 
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Evidence” that he now holds that “higher-order evidence about the bearing of one’s first-order 
evidence is typically relevant to what it is reasonable to believe on the basis of that evidence.”150 
Kelly further says that when we learn of a peer’s opposing belief that not-p, this has a 
moderating impact and tends to push what it is reasonable for us to believe about p in the 
direction of agnosticism.151 While Kelly now thinks that a peer’s opposing belief will have this 
moderating impact on the justification of our own belief, he still argues that no significant 
revision of belief or suspension of judgment needs to happen in peer disagreements. He argues 
that even if a peer’s opposing belief impacts the justification of one’s own belief, one can still be 
justified in sticking to his guns in a disagreement. Kelly’s argument for this is the subject of the 
next section.  
 In the end, we have seen in this section that Kelly’s first major objection to conciliatory 
views like Feldman’s, offered in his 2005 essay “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” 
is based on an argument meant to show that a peer’s opposing belief shouldn’t be considered as 
counter-evidence to one’s own belief. If we shouldn’t consider a peer’s opposing belief as 
counter-evidence, then we shouldn’t think of a peer’s opposing belief as defeating the 
justification for our own belief. We can agree with Kelly that there may be good reasons to think 
that a peer’s opposing belief doesn’t qualify as counter-evidence. However, defeating a belief 
with counter-evidence isn’t the only way to defeat a belief. A belief’s justification can be 
undermined, and in that sense defeated, simply if we have reason to doubt the adequacy of the 
                                                 
example comes from Paulina Silva and Sophie Horowitz’s article “Respecting all the Evidence” (Philosophical 
Studies 172, no. 11, 2015), 2836, 2838.   
 
150 Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” in Disagreement, eds. Richard Feldman and 
Ted A. Warfield (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010), 138-139. 
 
151 Ibid., 143.  
 72 
 
connection between one’s belief and its grounds. Feldman’s claim is that a peer’s belief that not-
p on the basis of E is evidence that it is not reasonable to believe p on the basis of E. If this is 
right, then our rationality in believing p on the basis of E is threatened. It seems that Kelly’s first 
objection has done little to remove this threat. 
 The Import of Correctly Assessing First-Order Evidence 
 The second major objection Kelly gave in his 2005 essay “The Epistemic Significance of 
Disagreement” to conciliatory views like Feldman’s is that, even if we assume that a peer’s belief 
does count as evidence that impacts the justification of one’s own belief, it wouldn’t follow that 
this evidence would completely eliminate one’s justification for believing as he does. As we saw 
in the last section, this is no longer just an ‘even if’ argument for Kelly, since he now thinks that 
higher-order evidence has at least some influence on what it is rational for one to believe on the 
basis of the first-order evidence. But even granting this, Kelly argues that one can still be 
justified in sticking to the disputed belief. 
Kelly says to suppose that you and I share the same first-order evidence E. You form the 
reasonable belief that p on the basis of E, while I form the unreasonable belief that not-p on the 
basis of E. Objectively, E is such as to rationalize the belief that p. So in this case, you properly 
evaluated our evidence E, while I have badly misjudged it. This means that there is an 
asymmetry in the epistemic statuses of our respective beliefs, due simply to the fact that E really 
does support p and does not support not-p. Suppose next that we become aware of our 
disagreement. Now our total evidence with respect to p has changed.  
Our new total evidence E* will include the following: 
E* = (i)  the original, first-order evidence E, 
        (ii)  the fact that you believe p on the basis of E, and 
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       (iii)  the fact that I believe not-p on the basis of E.152 
Kelly now says that the addition of (ii) and (iii) to our original evidence will make at least some 
difference to what it is reasonable for us to believe. (In his 2005 essay Kelly had argued that (ii) 
and (iii) wouldn’t make any difference.) Once (ii) and (iii) are added to our original evidence, a 
greater proportion of our total evidence supports an attitude of agnosticism than was previously 
the case. In other words, the evidence available to us now is on the whole less supportive of p 
than before. However, Kelly says that this result doesn’t mean that the new evidence E* will 
invariably mandate an attitude of suspension of belief with respect to p. Given that E is a 
substantial body of evidence that strongly favors p over not-p, we would expect that E* will also 
favor p over not-p, although not to as great a degree as E does.153 
Thus, to Kelly, there is no reason to think that your continuing to believe p is 
unreasonable on evidence E* given that it was reasonable when your total evidence consisted of 
just E. Our original evidence E doesn’t just vanish or become irrelevant once we learn what the 
other person believes on the basis of that evidence. Kelly says that when E is genuinely good 
evidence for p, this very fact will contribute to the justification for believing that E is good 
evidence for p – a fact that is available for those with the relevant competence.  
So in a case of disagreement in which one of the two peers evaluates the first-order 
evidence correctly, Kelly argues that the peer whose view more accurately reflects the evidence 
will typically be better justified in thinking that his view is the one that is favored by the first-
order evidence. Since one of the peers’ views will more accurately reflect the import of the first-
order evidence, this creates an asymmetry at the first-order level. This asymmetry at the lower 
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level tends to create an asymmetry at the higher-level, an asymmetry that otherwise would not 
have existed. The asymmetry created at the higher level is constituted by the fact that now one of 
the peers is more reliable on the question of whether p, since he more accurately evaluated the 
first-order evidence, while the other peer misjudged the evidence and so is less reliable than his 
peer. The upshot of this is that, given the asymmetry, one will have a rational reason to favor his 
own view and justifiably stick to his original belief, contra Feldman’s conciliatory view.154    
I think that Kelly’s argument here is based on an externalist idea of justification that 
evidentialists like Feldman wouldn’t grant. To draw this out, let’s suppose with Kelly that you 
believe p on the basis of E, I believe not-p on the basis of E, and that E actually supports p. 
Notice here that we both share the same set of evidence E, so there isn’t any evidence you have 
that I lack. This means that I am fully aware of your reasons for thinking that E supports p. 
However, I disagree with you. Given our shared evidence, I think that E supports not-p. Thus, on 
the basis of the very same evidence E, I form the belief that E actually supports not-p, while you 
hold the belief that E actually supports p.  
Now, in this case, it turns out that my belief is wrong, and yours is correct: E actually 
does support p metaphysically. In other words, if one were looking from an omniscient, objective 
perspective one would see that E actually supports p, and it does not support not-p. But notice 
that, while E actually supports p is a fact, it isn’t a fact that is a part of our shared evidence E. 
This is why I was able to (mistakenly) think that E supports not-p. Your thinking that E actually 
supports p is an assessment based on E, but not something contained in E itself. Similarly, my 
thinking that E actually supports not-p is an assessment based on E, but not something contained 
in E itself. 
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 So, what you and I disagree about is the evaluation of the first-order evidence. To be 
justified in our own assessment of whether p on the basis of E, we must offer compelling reasons 
in favor of our own evaluation of the first-order evidence E. This is the whole point of our 
debate. Hence, even if it is a fact (from an external perspective) that E actually supports p, and 
that there is an asymmetry between our beliefs in this way, as Kelly claims, you still need to 
come up with compelling reasons for thinking that you have in fact adequately evaluated E, and 
hence that E does actually support your own view. Simply claiming that E actually does support 
p and so justifies you in your belief seems to be an arbitrary move.155 David Enoch says that we 
should think of the peer disagreement itself as playing a role similar to that of an omniscient 
referee who tells two thinkers “one of you is mistaken with regard to p.” It is very hard to believe 
that the epistemically responsible way to respond to such a referee differs between the two 
parties, and so it is very hard to believe that the epistemic signiﬁcance of the disagreement itself 
is asymmetrical in the way Kelly suggests.156 
 So, what independent reason do you have indicating that E actually supports p? If you 
and I are thinking about whether p simply on the basis of our shared evidence E, as Kelly says 
we are, then for you to be justified in thinking that your assessment of E is correct and mine is 
wrong, you would have to have access to some reason that is additional to E that indicates this to 
you.  To Kelly, the fact that E actually supports p metaphysically, from an external point of view, 
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disagreement with.” But this is very disappointing advice. Enoch says that to be in a position to beneﬁt from this 
advice, our concerned thinker must know whether she has responded rightly to the initial evidence. But, of course, 
had she known that, she would not have needed the advice of an epistemologist to begin with (Enoch, 968). 
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just is the additional, independent reason that makes you justified in continuing to believe that E 
supports p. However, why is it reasonable to think that you would have knowledge of this 
metaphysical fact? If you have access to it, then I don’t see why I wouldn’t, given that we’re both 
just as intelligent and reliable thinkers. Importantly, if neither of us has access to the external fact 
that E actually supports p, then you cannot use this fact as a reason to favor your own view in the 
disagreement. Even if you are externally justified in thinking that E actually supports p, this isn’t 
relevant to whether you have an epistemic right to continue believing that E supports p unless 
you have access to that fact. On the evidentialist view outlined earlier in this chapter, we saw that 
one must have internal access to the reasons that justify his belief. Thus, unless you can point to 
some reason that is additional to E that indicates that E really supports p, you won’t be justified 
in continuing to prefer your own view over mine when we disagree about whether p on the basis 
of E.  
 I grant that Kelly is right in saying that there is an asymmetry present in peer 
disagreements when one of the peers has correctly assessed the first-order evidence. But from 
this it does not follow that the signiﬁcance of the disagreement itself is likewise asymmetrical, 
since I argue that it would be difficult for the peer who has correctly assessed the first-order 
evidence to be in possession of an independent reason indicating this to him and giving him 
knowledge that the asymmetry is working in his justificatory favor. By arguing this way we 
aren’t claiming that the first-order evidence should be ignored. Rather, it’s just that the higher-
order evidence (i.e., the peer’s disagreement) serves as an undercutting defeater of the original 
evidence, in the sense that the conjunction of the original evidence and the higher-order evidence 
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fails to support proposition p. As Feldman says, “It is, in some ways, like what happens to the 
belief that an object is red when one learns that a red light is shining [on] it.”157 
 Ultimately, the substance of Kelly’s second objection is that if one is actually justified in 
his belief that p (from an external standpoint), then one remains justified in his belief that p even 
after learning that his peer disagrees. But what’s important here isn’t whether one is externally 
justified in his belief, but whether one is epistemically justified in his belief. And I argue that, 
upon learning that one’s peer disagrees about whether p, one’s original epistemic justification for 
believing p gets undermined (whether or not one’s external justification does). While there will 
be an asymmetry of external justification present in such a disagreement, it seems unlikely that 
either of the peers would have access to this fact. If they lack access to this external asymmetry, 
then they cannot reason based on it. Thus, from their own perspectives what they will see is a 
symmetry that removes any rational basis for preferring their own views. And this is exactly why 
Feldman argues that they should suspend judgment:  
Even if it is true that the arguments in fact favor one side in the debate, the outcome of 
the discussion includes the participants’ realization that for each thing one of them can 
say in support of his view, the other can say something analogous in support of the other 
view. To stick to one’s guns in such a situation is to fail to treat like cases alike.158 
 
 Conclusion 
 In the end, it seems that neither Sosa’s objection from private evidence nor Kelly’s 
objections from first-order and higher-order considerations pose problems for Feldman’s 
conciliatory view. Thus, as Feldman says, it seems that in peer disagreements the reasonable 
thing to do is to give up beliefs that are otherwise well-supported. “This implies that . . . those 
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generally reasonable agents with whom we disagree . . . can undermine our ordinary knowledge 
and justification.”159 
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Concluding Remarks 
 A key feature of a peer disagreement is the symmetry of the situation. Feldman argues 
that two peers who are in a persistent, unresolved disagreement should suspend belief precisely 
because of this symmetry. Thus, the principle on which Feldman’s view depends is that, when 
one doesn’t have a rational basis to prefer one’s own view, or any of the competing views, one 
must refrain from believing any of the views. I find this principle intuitively compelling. If one 
accepts this principle, then one must judge whether peer disagreements are real-life instances to 
which this principle applies.  
 There is disagreement about this. The aim of this thesis has been to argue that certain 
objections to the idea that peer disagreements are real-life instances to which this principle 
applies fall short. In particular, we have found that objections from the quarter of private 
evidence (Sosa), or from considerations of the competition between higher-order and first-order 
epistemic evaluations (Kelly), fail to introduce any relevant asymmetries that would provide a 
rational basis for preferring one’s own position. If, then, real-life peer disagreements are cases 
where the relevant kind of symmetry exists between what one peer can offer in support of his 
view and what the other can offer in support of the opposite view, then neither peer has a rational 
basis for preferring his own view, and so, as Feldman argues, they should suspend judgment.160 
                                                 
160 In this thesis I only considered Sosa and Kelly’s objections to Feldman’s view. However, it is worth 
mentioning that a third common objection to conciliatory views like Feldman’s is that they are self-defeating. In his 
essay “How to Disagree about How to Disagree” Adam Elga says that the trouble with conciliatory views like 
Feldman’s is this: in many situations involving disagreement about disagreement, conciliatory views call for their 
own rejection. But it is incoherent for a view on disagreement to call for its own rejection. So, conciliatory views on 
disagreement are incoherent. To illustrate this point, Elga says to suppose that you have a conciliatory view on 
disagreement, but you find out that your respected friend disagrees. He has arrived at a competing view (about 
disagreement), and tells you all about it. If your conciliatory view is correct, then you should change your view. You 
should be pulled part way toward thinking that your friend is right. In other words, your view on disagreement 
requires you to give up your view on disagreement. Thus, a conciliatory view on disagreement like Feldman’s gets 
into trouble because it requires one to be conciliatory about absolutely everything, even its own correctness (179). 
Later in this essay Elga suggests a way in which conciliatory views can handle this objection. He says that 
instead of conciliatory views being completely conciliatory – i.e., counseling conciliation in every disagreement – 
such views can be partially conciliatory. A partially conciliatory view says that one should be moved by 
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 As Feldman notes, his conclusion on these matters is a skeptical conclusion. This 
conclusion implies that “we may have less knowledge, or fewer justified beliefs, than we might 
have otherwise thought. It seems to have the discouraging implication that thinking about 
epistemology, and conversing with intelligent people who disagree with us, can undermine the 
justification we have for our beliefs.”161 To some, this result may be troubling.162 One may think 
that there is something wrong about a method that counsels suspension of judgment on important 
issues. I don’t think this result is as unsettling as it may seem, though. For Feldman, suspension 
of judgment is the right attitude in some cases of disagreement – where the relevant kind of 
symmetry is present – but surely not in all cases of disagreement. Many disagreements can be 
rationally resolved and suspending judgment is not the proper outcome.  
                                                 
disagreement (and revise one’s original belief) about some subject matters, but not about disagreement itself. It 
might look arbitrary for a view to recommend that one be conciliatory about most matters, but not about 
disagreement itself. But Elga says that no arbitrariness is required. Elga explains that it is in the nature of giving 
consistent advice that one's advice be dogmatic with respect to its own correctness. Views on disagreement give 
advice on how to respond to evidence. So, in order to be consistent views on disagreement must be dogmatic with 
respect to their own correctness. In other words, the real reason for constraining conciliatory views is not specific to 
disagreement. Rather, the real reason is a completely general constraint that applies to any fundamental policy, rule, 
or method. In order to be consistent, a fundamental policy, rule, or method must be dogmatic with respect to its own 
correctness. This general constraint provides independent motivation for a view on disagreement to treat 
disagreement about disagreement in a special way. So partially conciliatory views need no ad hoc restrictions in 
order to avoid the self‐undermining problem. They need only restrictions that are independently motivated, 
according to Elga (184-185).Thus, it doesn’t seem that Feldman’s conciliatory view is threatened by the objection 
that such views are self-defeating and so incoherent. Feldman’s view needn’t be construed as requiring that we 
suspend judgment in every disagreement. Rather, his view can be construed as a partially conciliatory view that says 
we ought to suspend judgment in most peer disagreements, but not when it comes to disagreement about 
disagreement itself. Disagreement about disagreement should be treated in a special way, as the considerations 
above about giving consistent advice indicate. For an in-depth consideration of this objection, see Elga, “How to 
Disagree about How to Disagree,” in Disagreement, eds. Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 175-187. 
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162 Recall that Feldman’s view on disagreement flows from his evidentialist-internalist view. Thus, if one 
finds Feldman’s conclusions on disagreement to be troubling, then perhaps this gives one a reason to think that 
evidentialism is an inadequate view, and should be supplemented by or exchanged for some type of externalist view 
of knowledge and justification. 
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 Further, even where suspension of judgment is the proper result, this is “neither an awful 
outcome nor something that should make the process seem pointless.”163 If one has a belief about 
an issue and further investigation rationally leads to the result that one ought to suspend 
judgment, then the investigation has made a kind of progress. One will have learned that one’s 
earlier view depended upon a deeper principle that, on reflection, is not well supported. If this is 
in fact correct, then it is difficult to see what is bad about finding that out.164 
 I think that the call for suspending judgment in peer disagreements is also a call for 
modesty about the scope of rational belief. When we hold a belief confidently and then find out 
that an epistemic peer disagrees, a significant reduction of confidence is called for – suspension 
of judgment is called for, if one is persuaded by Feldman’s thinking. But nothing about this 
conclusion means that we should stop trying to discern the truth. It means living with reasonable 
doubt about some controversial matters. As Nathan Ballantyne says, “It means intellectual 
matters are often mysterious.”165 Having epistemic modesty in recognition of the fact that 
intellectual matters are often mysterious, and show themselves to be so in peer disagreements 
especially, doesn’t seem to be a bad thing. In some cases, it is virtuous to be silent, to refrain 
from confidently saying, “This is how things are.”  
 Finally, I offer a conjecture. Why is it that two peers, two individuals who are just as 
intelligent and well-informed, would have protracted disagreements; why is it that experts in 
certain fields, especially like philosophy, would have seemingly unending disagreements? My 
hunch is that David Christensen’s answer to this question is very near to whatever the right 
                                                 
163 Feldman, “Deep Disagreement, Rational Resolutions, and Critical Thinking” (Informal Logic 25, no. 1, 
2005), 22. 
 
164 Ibid.  
 
165 Ballantyne, “The Significance of Unpossessed Evidence” (The Philosophical Quarterly 65, no. 260, 
2015), 331.  
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answer is: “disagreement flourishes when epistemic conditions are bad.” When evidence is 
meager, or when, due to our emotional or intellectual limitations, we are not very good at 
reacting correctly to the evidence, disagreement flourishes. As Christensen says, “To focus in on 
my own field, I think that we should all acknowledge that epistemic conditions are not so great in 
philosophy.”166 I’m inclined to think this is right. I end with an observation from Descartes 
regarding the same matter: 
Of philosophy I will say nothing, except that when I saw that it had been cultivated for 
many ages by the most distinguished men, and that yet there is not a single matter within 
its sphere which is not still in dispute, and nothing, therefore, which is above doubt, I did 
not presume to anticipate that my success would be greater in it than that of others.167 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
166 Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News” (Philosophical Review 116, no. 2, 
2007), 214.  
 
167 Descartes, Discourse on Method (New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 2004), 8.  
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